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

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Teilhard de Chardin

by François Russo, S.J., and Robert J. Roth, S.J.

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

CHRISTIAN SKEPTICISM

■ *Catholics are used to hearing the charge that they are intellectual slaves who "have to believe" a great many things independently of their own judgment. The usual Catholic response is to give reasons why the teachings of the Church are believable and should be accepted.*

■ *The instinct that prompts this response is sound. A positive belief is better than the mere absence of belief. Modern men frequently regard themselves as emancipated because they have learned to doubt the faith of their ancestors. But the totally modern man—the man, that is, who is nothing but a product of his age—is under a constant temptation to slide into skepticism in philosophy and agnosticism in religion. This tendency is not unrelated to the psychological insecurity which is so often noted as one of the characteristics of our time. Not for nothing has it been called "The Age of Anxiety."*

■ *There is another emancipation that comes from faith rather than from its abandonment. Our Lord said: "If you continue faithful to My word . . . you will come to know the truth, and the truth will set you free." Free, first of all, from sin and from alienation from God. Free, too, from the emptiness and gnawing sense of the void that afflicts modern man. But free also—and this is worth stressing—from the necessity of believing a lot of errors.*

■ *For our age is not only an age of doubt. It is also, as a direct consequence, an age of ideologies, of intellectual fashions, of false and dangerous faiths. Men who cannot endure the misery of living in a purposeless and meaningless universe are easy prey to substitutes for religion.*

■ *The revolt against Christianity that began late in the 17th century was not initiated and carried on, for the most part, by men who believed nothing. The anti-Christian philosophers wanted to get rid of supernatural religion mainly because they saw it as an obstacle to realizing what we now know were utopian dreams.*

■ *Their criticism of Christianity was corrosive and immensely damaging to the faith of millions. But they themselves were inspired by the vision of a new heaven and a new earth, to be brought into existence by men's unaided efforts, without God, without divine revelation and without grace.*

■ *The "political messianism" that grew out of the anti-Christian revolt has been the cause of some of the worst evils of our time. The wars that have ravaged our century were born of secular substitutes for religion: nationalism, nazism and communism. Milder and less dangerous secular faiths also abound among masses of dechristianized people today. One thinks of scientism, eugenicism, popular Freudianism, democracy-as-a-religion and a host of other widely and uncritically held beliefs.*

■ *Surely it is not the least advantage of being a Christian that, precisely because one accepts the Apostles' Creed without reservation, one must gaze with a skeptical eye on the intellectual fashions of the age. A Christian may study politics, science, psychology or some other subject seriously. But he is inoculated against making a religion of any of them. He already has a religion.*

The Editors, CATHOLIC MIND

CHURCH, STATE AND EDUCATION:

THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE

EDWIN H. PALMER

The national system of education in The Netherlands has made a unique contribution to the solution of the problem of educational freedom. In essence, the Dutch plan has been in effect since 1920, thus affording almost a half century of practical testing. This writer was acquainted with the system before having studied in The Netherlands, and he was thoroughly opposed to it, chiefly because he felt that it contradicted the principle of separation of Church and State. But after four years of first-hand acquaintance with this plan, he became convinced that America can profit greatly by carefully analyzing both the system itself and the years of dialogue that preceded it.

The history of the modern Dutch

An address at the convention of Citizens for Educational Freedom, Philadelphia, Pa., October 26, 1963. Dr. Palmer is a member of the Pennsylvania Board of Directors of CEF and dean of men at Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, Pa.

educational system is known as the *schoolstrijd,* the school struggle. It has been essentially a struggle for freedom and has had two phases: 1) the struggle on the part of the independent school for the legal or constitutional freedom to exist; and 2) the struggle for the actual freedom to exercise the legal freedom. If the central theme of freedom is kept in mind, the details of the history of the *schoolstrijd* will then be unified and more meaningful.

STRUGGLE FOR LEGAL FREEDOM

After the Reformation, Dutch public education was generally and thoroughly Calvinistic. Article 36 of the Belgic Confession—the confession of the dominating Calvinistic, Reformed churches—delineated the duty of the state in general and its operating of the schools in particular. Article 36 stated that the state's task was to "remove and prevent all idolatry and false worship, that the kingdom of anti-Christ may be thus destroyed and the kingdom of Christ promoted." Thus, the teachers in the schools had to be members of the Reformed churches which subscribed to the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. They taught the Reformed faith and excluded any books, such as Roman Catholic ones, that were against their religious convictions.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the philosophy of the Enlightenment gradually supplanted the philosophy of Calvinism in the schools. Rationalism, deism and naturalism came to be the order of the day. To be sure, the Reformed faith had left its mark upon the people, so that some teachers still continued teaching in its spirit. Even Article 22 of the educational law of 1806 specified that the school children should be developed in "all social and Christian virtues." Yet, according to the next Article, the distinctive doctrines of the different churches could not be taught. School classes were to be opened with "a short and appropriate Christian prayer in a reverent fashion." Yet the Christianity offered was a Christianity without the "scandal" of the gospel. It was, in other words, a watered-down version that had lost its vitality and character just because it had eliminated the specific and concrete in order not to offend anybody.

The transition in the Dutch schools from Calvinism to a vague, lowest-common-denominator religion that outwardly had some Christian trappings might be compared to the transition in the American schools during the same period. Originally, our nation's schools were positively Christian and had a distinctively Protestant character. Gradually they lost that distinctiveness in the interest of a lowest-common-denominator philosophy that would mollify various Protestants, Roman Catholics or Jews. Just as the American Roman Catholics opposed Bible reading in the American state schools in the last century, chiefly because the Authorized Version was used, so also the Dutch Roman Catholics opposed the Bible in their state schools.

Furthermore, in 1830 a royal decree forbade the use of any books in class that would be offensive to religious groups. Twelve years later, another royal decree allowed any cleric to request any teacher in the governmental schools to furnish a list of all the books that were used in his class. If the cleric found books

that were objectionable from a religious standpoint, then an appeal was made to the supervisor who had the authority to remove them. As a result of these various forces, the Dutch school soon became a school without the Bible. Some even charged that it was anti-Christian.

This change from Calvinism to humanism led to an increasing dissatisfaction with the state schools and made many desirous of establishing schools where their children could be educated in the same philosophy of life they received at home and in church. Here, in the parental desire for schools that reflected the families' religious convictions, and in the lack of freedom to have such schools, were sown the seeds of the *schoolstrijd.*

The first laws that regulated all the schools of the country (1801, 1803, 1806) technically allowed independent schools. There were many in existence in 1800. But the freedom to establish new schools was so greatly restricted that few independent schools were established in the first half of the 19th century. Permission had to be granted by the local governments. Sometimes, however, when the authorities realized that the requests for new schools arose out of a dissatisfaction with the "neutral" state schools, they refused permission. Thus requests to establish schools were denied in The Hague, Uithuizen, Uithuizermeeden, Nijmegen, Zandweer, Beilen, Hoogeveen and Meppel. Other requests were granted only after much delay. This lack of educational freedom was one reason why many Dutch came to Michigan and Iowa in 1846 and during the following years.

Gradually, complete freedom to establish independent schools became a reality. In 1842, a royal decree opened the way for appeal when local communities declined permission to establish schools. The most fundamental change, however, came six years later when the Constitution was revised. 1848 was the year of many European revolutions, and the knowledge of what was happening elsewhere led King William II to introduce constitutional changes that were finally adopted. Among them was a regulation that guaranteed the right to establish free schools, i.e., nongovernmental schools that were free from government control. The government, of course, maintained its right to demand that the teachers be capable and of good moral character. This victory for freedom was the result of the collaboration of the Reformed (Protestant), Roman Catholic and Liberal political parties.

Van der Brugghen (Reformed) emphasized the spirit of the revisors of the Constitution when he stated that the right to educate does not belong to the state but to the parents. The state's duty, he said, was only to see that there were good teachers. In the same line, Groen Van Prinsterer (also Reformed) had expressed himself earlier (1840) in Parliament: "Parents who, with or without sufficient ground, are convinced that the religious orientation of the teaching in a particular school is un-Christian, must not, either directly or indirectly, be hindered from giving their children the kind of education that they feel is necessary before God. Such coercion, I say it plainly, is intolerable and must cease. It is presumption that springs from the doctrine of the French Revolu-

tion which views the children as the property of the state."

The constitutional revision also provided that governmental education be provided everywhere in the country, and it codified the royal decrees of 1830 and 1842 so that the teaching in the state schools would be given "with respect for everyone's religious convictions."

Although the Constitution gave freedom for the establishing of independent schools, hampering restrictions by the local governments still remained in effect until the new educational law of 1857. In 1849, for example, only two new Protestant schools came into being. Even Groen Van Prinsterer, the political leader, was able to establish a Christian (Protestant) school in 1849 only after having been denied the privilege for five years. But in December of 1849 the Liberal Prime Minister Thorbecke encouraged the school authorities to be more liberal in their handling of requests for new schools. As a result, some forty independent schools were established between 1849 and 1857. But it was the new educational law of 1857—the Van der Brugghen law—that finally gave in practice what 1848 had given in principle.

From that time on, the independent schools grew in great numbers. A prime reason for this growth was the "neutralization" of the governmental schools. ("Neutralization" and "neutral" are put in quotes because, in many people's minds, there is no such thing as "neutral" education. Even secularism is a religion. It relates studies to ultimate values, even if in a negative way.) Between 1849 and 1857, a great struggle developed over the character of the state schools. Some wanted a *facultatieve splitzing* of the state schools into at least three groupings: Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish. This and other solutions were voted down in Parliament in favor of a "neutral" school in which the teachers were to "abstain from teaching, doing or permitting anything that was in conflict with the respect due to the religious ideas of others" (Article 23). Yet the same Article demanded that the children receive an "upbringing in all Christian and social virtues."

For a few years, this ambiguity created a conflict in practice, similar to the situation in American state schools. In spite of Supreme Court decisions which have ruled out religious indoctrination, teachers in certain communities, especially those predominantly Protestant or Roman Catholic, have openly taught religion in the classrooms. Sometimes it has been difficult to distinguish between the Christian and state schools. For Holland still had a Christian heritage and conscience which it did not want to obliterate even in the state schools. It did not want to appear heathenish.

Yet neither did it want to offend the religious sensibilities of the non-Christian. The absolute "neutrality" interpretation came to clarity in two decisions. One was in 1860, when a capable Jewish lawyer, A. de Pinto, protested the teaching of the Bible in the state schools. The other decision was in the following year, when a school inspector, Hofstede de Groot, was discharged because he advocated instruction in Bible stories, including the central facts of Christianity. (Note that America is approximately 100 years behind Holland's timetable.

This is true both of the prohibition of Bible readings in governmental schools and of financial equalization.)

Thus in fifty years Dutch education had changed from "Christian" education to secular education. The educational act of 1806 had required an instruction that would be "Christian," even though the word had been robbed of most of its significance. The law of 1857 was soon interpreted to mean that education was to be absolutely "neutral." It was this "neutral" character of state education which, together with the newly-won right freely to establish schools of one's choice, led to the great growth in independent schools, especially among the Reformed Protestants and Roman Catholics. The Union of Christian Schools—"the schools with the Bible"—had already been formed and was active. In 1868, the Roman Catholic bishops sent out a *Mandement* in which they roundly condemned the state schools and encouraged schools of their own faith. "What are we to think," they wrote, "of schools where the influence of the Church and religion has been banished . . . ? Catholics may not approve such teaching. The teaching in the public neutral schools may never be viewed as anything else than a sad necessity."

STRUGGLE FOR ACTUAL FREEDOM

Now began the second phase of the *schoolstrijd*. The first phase centered on the right to legal existence; the second, on the right to actual existence. The first concerned formal freedom; the second, material freedom. The first lasted fifty years; the second was to last seventy years.

Already in the first phase of the struggle for educational freedom there had been an awareness that, even if the free schools were permitted to be established, there still remained the question whether the people could actually afford them. Van der Brugghen had even suggested the possibility of state subsidy in 1857, but the Lower House turned down this proposal. In the years following the Van der Brugghen law, an economic depression and low salaries were the two factors that prevented the free schools from mushrooming as might have been expected, now that the people had full legal freedom to establish them.

There are three principal dates to remember in this second phase of the fight for educational freedom—1878, 1889 and 1920.

The first date marked a defeat for freedom which, however, proved later to be a catalytic force that eventually led to freedom. The background of the defeat began in 1871, when a report was made to Parliament concerning the effect which the lack of proper education was having on the army. The Prime Minister, Kappeyne van de Coppello, correctly interpreted this to mean that Dutch educational standards had to be raised and that this could not be left to accident or arbitrariness. Therefore, he sought to improve the quality of instruction in all elementary schools by introducing a bill in 1878 which, among other things, would limit the size of the classes to forty students and which would demand a better training for the teachers.

The orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics reacted strongly against this proposal, for they saw that, while the government schools would have little difficulty meeting the new standards, since they were

supported by tax money, such a bill would increase the already difficult financial burdens of their own schools. Some questioned the democracy of a school tax method whereby public money was given to schools to which some had conscientious objections, and which was denied their own schools, even though these schools met the demanded academic standards, and even though their pupils also needed a good education for the army. They saw that the governmental schools were placed over against their own schools in a favorable competitive position through their own tax money. They reacted against this financial inequality.

Four years earlier Kappeyne had shown his distaste for even the existence of independent schools when in Parliament he opposed Abraham Kuyper's plea for equal rights for all parents in education. Kappeyne declared: "Now I ask, can any father say that it is his duty to withhold elementary education from his child when the school in which that instruction is enjoyed has been opened to the child without cost? If it be said, 'If that is what you want, you are oppressing the minority,' I would almost say, 'Then that minority had better be oppressed, for in that case it is "the fly which causes the oil of the perfumer to send forth an evil odor" (Eccl. 10:1) and has no right to exist in our society.' " His remarks on the oppression of the minority were typical of the illiberality of the Liberals in regard to equal educational rights.

In the midst of the 1878 debate, Abraham Kuyper—later, Prime Minister—went to the heart of the matter when he wrote in his paper, the *Standaard,* on July 23: "The whole school question is a question of poor and rich. If you are very rich, then, even if you have been blessed with twelve children, there is no school problem for you, either on the lower level of education or the higher. But woe to you if you do not have that much money. Freedom to establish a school with the Bible—oh, yes, certainly you have that. The law is as liberal as can be. You certainly may have a school with God's Word—if you pay for the school. Listen well, now—after you have paid for your neighbor's school."

Such reasoning apparently made little impact upon the members of Parliament, for both houses decisively passed the Kappeyne bill.

But then a sleeping nation was aroused into an action that was not only to affect the educational system but also the political life of the entire nation. Kuyper led a *Volkspetitionnement* by which an impressive 305,102 people (out of a population of four million) and 421 churches signed a petition requesting the King not to sign the bill.

Though the King did sign, and though the law went into effect, the protest proved to the Protestant and Roman Catholic political parties that Parliament did not truly represent the majority of the people. Only eleven per cent of the male population over twenty-three years of age was eligible to vote for members of Parliament. The Protestant party, in particular, was thus to become a spokesman for the *"kleine luyden"*—the common people.

Thus, by taking a positive stand for greater emancipation of the voter and for freedom in education, Kuyper attracted many to his party. In fact, although the Protestant Antirevolutionary party had been in existence for many years, 1878 may be

considered as the birthday of the *organized* party. Furthermore, Kuyper's eyes were opened to the fact that since 164,000 Roman Catholics had signed the petition, it might be possible to form a coalition government with the Roman Catholic party. This was the coalition which eventually brought educational equality and freedom to Holland. Such co-operation was not easy for either party. Both held to strong convictions and unpleasant memories. Yet they realized that without compromising their religious beliefs and by restraining their attacks on the other's theology, there were certain areas in politics where they could work together. This policy continues to the present day.

In 1887, the Protestants and Roman Catholics were able to modify the Constitution so that 26.8 per cent of the male population over twenty-three years of age was able to vote. And in the following year, they succeeded in replacing the Liberal party's leadership and were now ready for a new educational law. Thus, the 1878 defeat was basically a victory for freedom in education.

The second major date in the *schoolstrijd* for material freedom was 1889. After the Protestants and Roman Catholics formed the coalition government in 1888, Prime Minister Makay introduced and secured the passage of an educational bill that partially revised the inequities of the ten-year-old Kappeyne law. This law of 1889 provided that the free schools should receive their proportional share of the national funds for the salaries of the teachers. The taxes were to be distributed according to the number of students in the schools.

The Makay law did not yet provide full equity for the free schools. Only a third of their total educational costs was supplied, and the new demands for better education wiped out much of this newly won aid. But the principle of equity was attained for the first time. The free schools were now put on a basis similar to that of governmental schools. The latter were no longer considered as sufficient for all the people. The pluralism of religious convictions was respected. This was the beginning of the full realization of actual educational freedom. The principle had been won, but it would take another thirty years to reach full *financiele gelijkstelling* (financial equalization) between free schools and government schools.

The third important date to remember in the second phase of the *schoolstrijd* is 1920. Between 1889 and 1920, there was a gradual financial emancipation process for the free schools. This evolution was crowned with what some consider to be the acme of justice, equality and freedom in the world's educational systems.

I mention only the highlights of this gradual evolution over those thirty years. In 1901, a law granted the free elementary schools financial rights equal to those of the government schools in the building of schools. There still remained favoritism for the state schools in many financial areas, however, including the supplementation of the national funds for building costs by the local communities. Two years later, pension laws treated the teachers of the free and state schools in equal fashion. In 1905, Parliament increased the outlays for both the salaries and the upkeep of the elementary schools.

The year 1912 saw another increase in allotments for operating expenses (Heemskerk ministry). Laws in 1905 (*gymnasia*) and 1909 (*middelbaar*) provided modest beginnings for the principle of financial equality for secondary schools.

The beginning of the final step toward complete *financiele gelijkstelling* was initiated by a royal decree of 1913. A "pacification committee" was appointed from all political parties in an attempt to end the *schoolstrijd* by modifying Article 192 of the Constitution. After three and a half years of debate, in which all the arguments pro and con of the previous years were brought forward again, Parliament overwhelmingly reached a "pacification" decision. The Lower House accepted the proposed constitutional changes by a vote of 57 to 10, and the Upper House passed it unanimously.

Three years later the constitutional principle of *financiele gelijkstelling* was embodied in the Elementary Educational Law of 1920, the life work of the Minister of Education, Dr. de Visser. It was passed by a vote of 75 to 3 in the Lower House. Two of the three who voted against the bill were Communists.

The significant features of the revised Constitution and the Visser law are these:

- In the 1815 Constitution the adjective "public" was dropped in front of "education," so that article 192 now read: "Education is the object of continual governmental care."
- The financing of government schools was to become the norm for aiding the free schools. This aid pertained to teachers' salaries, erection of buildings and maintenance costs.
- The government was given the right to investigate the academic and moral qualifications of all teachers and schools.
- The 1848 law which guaranteed freedom from government interference in matters of religiously oriented instruction was preserved.

The *schoolstrijd* was now ended. The nation recognized that the free schools were as significant for education as the government schools and that all should, therefore, receive equal financial treatment. Instead of distributing taxes to only one type of school, a type that many did not want because of religious convictions, the nation chose to give the taxes to all, regardless of their religious creed. In this way, it did not use the taxing power of the nation to coerce parents into choosing secularistic schools when secularism was contrary to their Jewish, Roman Catholic or Protestant beliefs. The poor now had as much freedom of educational choice as the rich. Actual, not only theoretical, equality and freedom had been won.

So far we have looked at the *schoolstrijd* only on the pre-university level. It may also be instructive to note the parallel struggle for freedom in institutions of higher learning.

Just as on the lower level of education there were two phases of the *schoolstrijd,* so also were there two phases on the university level: 1) the *strijd* (struggle) for a legal or constitutional freedom to exist; and 2) the *strijd* for actual freedom to exist.

In the first part of the 19th century, the government had a monopoly on higher education, operating the nation's only universities: Leiden,

Utrecht and Groningen. These, including the divinity schools, were governed by a rationalistic, humanistic philosophy of life that had only vague affinities with Christianity. The right to establish free universities was written into the Constitution at the same time that the legal freedom was granted to the elementary and secondary schools (1848). But without parliamentary laws to exercise this right, the constitutional theory was an empty right.

The same arguments that were used in the *schoolstrijd* for freedom on the lower level of education were also used in connection with the higher level. Some were frankly against Christian education on any plane. Others followed the French Revolutionary idea that only the state had the right to run a university. But Parliament recognized that free choice in university education is also the right of parents and private organizations.

Accordingly, a major victory for the legal freedom of higher education was won with the passage of the Heemskerk educational law of 1876. This law regulated the establishment of new private universities. Four years later (1880), the law was first utilized when Abraham Kuyper established a Calvinistic university in Amsterdam. Significantly, he called it the Free University, a name which symbolized the goal of the *schoolstrijd* on all levels. It was called "Free" because it was free from government interference. The professors were not limited to teaching only what would not offend a Roman Catholic, Jew, modernist or humanist. Rather, they were free boldly to relate all their instruction to the Word of God as they interpreted it. Today there is a second free (with a small "f") university, a Roman Catholic one, established in Nijmegen in 1923. There are also some business and technical colleges or institutes.

Constitutional freedom having been won, there remained, nevertheless, two restrictions which deprived the free universities of a great portion of their actual freedom. First of all, the degrees of non-governmental universities did not enjoy the status of *effectus civilis*. Students who graduated from the free university were obliged to take exams under professors in a state university before they could be admitted to certain professions. Thus, although free universities could be established, the degrees were not of the same value, even though their instruction might have been superior to that of the governmental schools. Prime Minister Kuyper realized that this was a serious denial of freedom, not only for his own university, but also for any free university that might be established in the future. After a bill to rectify this inequity was defeated, Kuyper succeeded in holding new elections for Parliament, and the new Parliament passed the law in 1905. Thus, he "re-founded" the university on its silver anniversary.

The second restriction on actual freedom was financial. Although independent universities were permitted to be established, no financial aid was given to them at the beginning. This meant, in effect, that the wealth of the whole nation was poured into universities with a philosophy of life that was radically opposed to that of the majority of the nation. Therefore, the independent universities suffered great handicaps through the competition of tax-supported universities. Their actual freedom suffered greatly. A parallel

is seen in America, where private universities, which used to have the majority of students, have now lost that majority to government schools. Tax money for governmental schools has made it impossible for many private schools to compete, thus forcing them out of existence and denying them their actual (not legal) freedom.

In Holland, the responsibility of the government to treat all educational systems equally was admitted in principle in Kuyper's educational act of 1905. As a token, Parliament allotted four thousand guilders to any qualified free university. This sum was insignificant in comparison with the millions which the state universities received, but the principle had at least been established.

There remained opposition, however, for many years, to any increase in subsidy. But gradually the nation came to see that the independent universities performed an important public cultural function that the state universities could not fulfill for a great percentage of the people. In 1948, therefore, almost the whole Parliament, including the Socialists, voted a *financiele gelijkstelling* for all universities.

Since 1960, the national government has been paying 95 per cent of the costs of the Free University of Amsterdam, the Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen, the Catholic Economic University of Tilburg and the Economic University of Rotterdam (secular).

In these ways, a great measure of actual freedom has been granted to the non-governmental independent universities.

How do the present laws in The Netherlands work out in the concrete? Suppose some parents of certain religious convictions are dissatisfied with the elementary education in the state schools—primarily because they feel that God is left out. These parents can form a school association. They can make a petition to the local government for aid in establishing a school according to their religious principles. If their town is under 50,000 in population, they will have to guarantee that there will be fifty children in school. If they are in a municipality of 50,000 to 100,000, the required number will be 100. If they are in a city of 100,000 or more, the minimum will be 125. If there are not enough children to form a new school, then the parents may send their children to a neighboring town where there is a school of their own choice. The government will pay for the transportation in this case.

Within thirty days, the municipal authorities must give an answer. If the answer is yes, then the municipal authorities proceed to build a school. They pay for the entire cost of the buildings and furnishings. They will also pay for any additions, for the lighting, heating, cleaning, general upkeep of the building and the means of education (books, maps and the like). The school association has freedom to pick the kind of building that it wants, but the state school is the norm by which the financial aid is granted. In other words, this school association may not choose a luxurious building and expect the civil authorities to pay for it. But if they desire extra fine furnishings, then they are free to have them, but they must pay the additional costs.

Each year the school board will have to draw up a budget for the

cost of operating the school (apart from salaries), and this must be approved by the municipal authorities and by a national inspector of education. It will be judged by the cost in the state school, although it may go over that set amount if real need can be shown by the independent school. When approved, the town or city will pay it all.

To protect the town from fly-by-night schools, the school boards must put in escrow fifteen per cent of the cost of the building and furnishings. If, at the end of thirty years, the school is still in existence and still has the required number of pupils, then the money is returned with interest. If not, it is forfeited.

As far as salaries are concerned, the national government, rather than the local government, pays these entirely on the same pay scale as is operative in the governmental schools. It determines how many teachers were necessary for the student body the previous year. Then it gives the money to the school board, which in turn pays the teachers directly.

Thus, the national and local governments pay equally to both the free and the government schools all the expenses necessary for a good education. All of these privileges demand, of course, that the recipient schools fulfill certain conditions. In other words, the people are not going to waste money on a dancing school or a driver's school.

What are these conditions? What means are there to determine if the conditions are fulfilled? In demanding the fulfillment of certain conditions, is the freedom of the schools lost after all?

To begin with the first question, the national government appoints inspectors for all schools. The ministry of education strives to appoint inspectors of the differing faiths in proportion to the faiths of the schools represented. These inspectors have free access at any time to any school and any class room. Their duty is to visit every teacher and pupil in their classrooms at least once a year. Among other things, they have the right to check the following matters:

- The teacher-pupil ratio (Remember that the national government pays the salaries);
- The teachers' general health and moral character;
- The teachers' teaching certificates;
- The over-all plan of study and the content of these classes (Just as in America, they demand that certain subjects be taught);
- The holding of at least 1,040 classes per year for each student.

If schools do not live up to these conditions, the inspector can report this to the Department of Education, and the financial aid will be terminated. This practically never occurs. These conditions are necessary in order to insure the proper academic and health standards in the schools and a wise use of the taxpayers' money.

But the desired and necessary freedom is still retained. Complete freedom remains in the following areas:

- The appointment of the teachers, principals and other personnel is left entirely in the hands of the local school boards.
- The nature of the instruction, whether oriented to the Calvinistic,

Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Jewish or so-called "neutral" faith, is not subject to inspection, though the inspectors may check on the quality of instruction. The inspectors may demand that so many hours of Dutch history be taught, or literature, or Dutch, but they may not interfere in the slightest with the religious orientation of these subjects, the philosophical presuppositions which govern this instruction.

- The method of teaching in the Dutch schools may range from the classical type of instruction to the progressive type.
- The state schools, for obvious reasons, are required to accept all children. But the free schools may set up their own standards of acceptance, and the principals may dismiss children because of behavior.

It should be noted that there is a good rapport between the school boards and inspectors. The school boards will often seek the advice of the inspectors in matters regarding personnel, the physical plant, and the method of instruction. Because the inspectors visit so many classes (over a thousand a year) and so many different kinds of schools, they are capable of giving many valuable suggestions—suggestions, however, the school boards are entirely free to accept or reject. This rapport is also evidenced in the usual invitation by the schools to the inspector to attend various school functions, such as the opening of a new school, anniversaries and parents' nights, at which time he often is invited to make some remarks.

We in the United States can learn about educational freedom from Holland's example. It was chiefly the Protestant Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper who drew the guide lines for Dutch policy. He believed in co-operation with Roman Catholics when common principles were at stake. He felt that equality and freedom of choice in education was an inalienable right of every citizen, including Roman Catholics. At the same time, he urged his followers to hold to their religious convictions. Kuyper was not only a politician and an educator, but one of Holland's greatest theologians. Right in the midst of the *schoolstrijd,* on the occasion of the tercentenary anniversary of the Saint Bartholomew's massacre (1572), Kuyper reissued his frank brochure on the subject. Though he disagreed violently with Rome's theology, he advocated coalition with Roman Catholic Dr. Schaepman's forces in order to obtain justice.

Neither must we engage in theological debates. Our task is not to convert others to the Jewish, Roman Catholic or Protestant view of education. Our sole duty is to win complete educational freedom for all Americans. Just as Jews, Unitarians, Lutherans, atheists, Seventh-day Adventists and Roman Catholics vote in Congress for causes all think just without abandoning theological convictions, so also must all faiths work together for the precious, inalienable, parental freedom of educational choice.

In our country, Geneva, Rome and Jerusalem must work together. We may disagree on theology, but we must agree, even if it be for different reasons, on the need for educational freedom. *Eendracht maakt macht:* "In unity there is strength." Divided, we shall accomplish nothing. Together we shall win a notable victory for freedom for which future American generations will be thankful.

MSGR. JOHN J. EGAN

CHURCH AND SYNAGOGUE IN THE COMMUNITY

If there is one underlying theme which unites Catholics, Protestants and Jews, it is the belief in a personal God, to whom we all have the obligation to give witness, and in the essentially-related belief that all men, as special creatures of God, possess a unique dignity by virtue of their creation. This notion of kinship in God is so deeply embedded in the tradition of all our faiths that it cannot be rejected without at the same time rejecting our place in the community of the Judeo-Christian faithful.

It is precisely this aspect of the Judeo-Christian tradition which has been under persistent and successful attack for well over a century.

Undoubtedly, the most spectacular of the attacks was launched by Marx and Engel. The infamous dictum that "religion is the opiate of the people" is well-expressed in the totalitarian systems which explicitly reject unique individual dignity and which relate the entire meaning of the individual to the progress of society.

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Yet, if the dialectic of *Das Kapital* is the most spectacular rejection of the kinship in God, it is, for the American scene at least, probably not the most significant. In actual practice, *Das Kapital* utilized a view of the nature of man which took a different form, but the same substance, in the Anglo-American philosophy of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner. Spencerian philosophy enjoys the distinction of being the most pervading and enduring of all the philosophies of man ever proposed on the American continent. It is, indeed, so pervading that it has influenced, subtly but effectively, the Judeo-Christian tradition in America. And that is the source of our difficulty.

■ What is this Spencerian view? Drawing an analogy from the purely biological findings of Darwin, the English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, in a series of volumes entitled *Synthetic Philosophy* published in the early 1860's, proposed that man is a social organism in evolutionary process toward perfection and that, at the social level, the same processes of natural selection are in play as Darwin found in the biological world. Man evolves toward a more perfect strain as the unfit, the misfits, and the weak die off from their lack of competitive ability. And, Spencer holds, this is good. The weak die off so that the race becomes perfected. It is their function in life; and if we interfere with the process, or permit the weak to live and breed, we merely impede the progress of society.

Spencer's thesis, which came to be known as Social Darwinism, was popularized on the American scene by the prolific William Graham Sumner in his *Essays*. His own words are quite succinct:

> Many . . . are frightened at liberty, especially under the form of competition, which they elevate into a bugbear. They think it bears harshly on the weak. They do not perceive that here "the strong" and "the weak" are terms which admit of no definition unless they are made equivalent to the industrious and the idle, the frugal and the extravagant. They do not perceive, furthermore, that if we do not like the survival of the fittest, we have only one possible alternative, and that is the survival of the unfittest. The former is the law of civilization; the latter is the law of decay.

With hindsight, it is easy to see that the Spencerian dictum and the dictum of *Das Kapital* are remarkably similar. In each, the individual is meaningless except as he serves as a cog in the perfection of the race. The specific difference between Marx and Spencer is that the former rejected capitalism

and free enterprise, while the latter provided a most accommodating rationale for its abuses.

As a coherent theory, Social Darwinism was discredited in the cataclysm of the Great Depression. But it has never been completely rejected in the American ethos. As late as World War II, for instance, textbooks being used at the Harvard School of Business were direct and detailed interpretations of Spencer's thesis. Most of the present leaders of the American business community were educated in a system which explicitly taught the Spencerian thesis as the ultimate philosophical rationale for the free enterprise system.

It is, however, a deteriorating point of view. As a coherent philosophy, it need not overly concern us. But its residual effects on American society bear a direct relationship to the problem of race relations.

■ The most obvious of these residual effects is in our attitude toward the poor. Americans admit, if grudgingly and with one eye on the tax bill, that it is a good thing to give aid to the deserving poor—to those who through no fault of their own are unable to make their way in society. But the emphasis is on "deserving." The man who will not work, or the man whose personality apparatus prevents him from being competitive, or the lazy man, or the shiftless man, is not deserving of our help. If we must help him, in order to keep him from practicing violence against the good order of the state, at least we need keep him no more than alive and submissive.

This habitual distinction between the "deserving" poor and the "unfit" poor is the most compelling evidence that we do not really implement our primal religious belief in the God-related dignity of man. We are still dominated by the Spencerian dictum that man is worthy of our attention only as he actively contributes to society, only as he has a utilitarian purpose.

■ Thus, while our American ethos gives lip service to the notion of the dignity of man, the practical customs by which a society implements its ethos deny this notion. The apparent contradiction between our juridical assent to the rights of man and our treatment of minorities, is more easily understood against this background. In reality, our allegiance to the rights of man is juridical only. It has not been accompanied by the only concept which gives it meaning and ultimate rationality—kinship in God.

Both history and logic compel us to believe that unique, individual dignity is inconceivable except as the individual relates to the Judeo-Christian God. The Greek city-state of Aristotle and Plato gave us perhaps the highest expression of a civilization ordered outside the framework of God the Father.

Yet Aristotle's concept of the poor is not far different from that of Spencer. Extreme poverty, Aristotle holds, "lowers the character of a democracy" and therefore the poor should be given means to help themselves. But let the help be only in the form of means to better themselves. If the poor do not better themselves, then aid to them is wasteful.

Historically, it is in the Jewish and Christian tradition that the poor possess a dignity which rises above their utility and the good order of society —precisely because their dignity, as well as the dignity of all, is based upon a relationship with God that transcends the proximate purposes of society. Thus, it is the specific mission of the churches and synagogues to infuse into our society that understanding of the unique dignity of each man which comes from his status as a creature of God—a dignity so unique that he deserves our personal commitment whether he be rich or poor; a dignity so unique that, if poor, he deserves our help whether he be ambitious or lazy, moral or immoral, grateful or belligerent; a dignity so unique that he deserves our understanding regardless of his skin, his temperament, or his cultural traditions.

■ For there is a direct and vital relationship between the problem of dignity in God and the problem of race relations. As there is no intelligible basis for aiding the poor and unfit outside of the concept of a God who is Father, there is no intelligible basis for racial tolerance outside of the concept of God who is Father. Given the assumption that there is no God of Israel, that men are left to their own devices, both the extinction of a race and the extinction of the poor are rational, economical and humanitarian approaches to the perfectability of man. Hitler was no less rational than Spencer; and neither was less rational than the rabid Southern (or Northern) racist. All either explicitly or implicitly reject the fundamental basis of belief in the God of Israel.

I have examined the problem of our attitude toward the poor, not only because it illustrates the gap in our mores of individual dignity (upon which any sound race relations must be built), but because, in the present crisis, the poor and the racial minorities are often and extensively identified with each other. Or, perhaps in a larger sense, the question of wealth and poverty has been intertwined with all minority relations in America. All immigrant groups, all minority groups, in America, have been at first poor. To be at once poor and a minority has been the lot of all our "strangers in the land," as the studies of John Higham and Oscar Handlin demonstrate. It has not been an easy lot. Historically, American antipathies toward the poor have blended with American antipathies toward minorities, and the stereotype

still prevails. Indeed, once an immigrant group has ceased to be predominantly poor, it has ceased to be regarded as a minority in the general American consciousness. Thus, although residual and often painful prejudices still work against Catholics and Jews, the public consciousness does not place them in the same minority category as Negroes, Southern whites, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans.

This intertwining of identification (and hostility) towards the poor and towards minorities has profound implications for contemporary race relations. For it is all too easy for the latent racist to rationalize his hostility toward minorities on the basis of their poverty. It is all too easy to ask: "Why don't they help themselves?" It is all too easy to assume, with Spencer, that the Negro, for instance, is poor; and poor because lazy; and because lazy, not worthy of concern.

While, on the one hand, we argue for racial tolerance on the ground that all men are creatures of God, and thus possessed of their unique dignity, we permit ourselves to apply Spencer's test of fitness to the poor. We thus perpetuate a moral double standard which is not lost to our people. We cannot expect to be taken seriously on the question of race relations, if we do not insist on being taken seriously on the question of the poor. The point is that we will never be successful in eliminating the cancer of racial intolerance from our society until we also eliminate the cancer of intolerance of the poor. We need to keep clearly in mind that whatever educative value our institutional practices take on—whether they be primary, as in the case of our educational forms, or secondary, as in the case of the example of our administrative actions—their image must reflect the totality of our belief in the dignity of man, which extends to the poor as well as to the minority, which does not ask, "What good are you?" or "What are you?" but which asks, in fact, no questions at all.

We must keep clearly in mind that race relations rest on the same basis as all other human relations—on the notion of man's dignity in God. When we practice unjust wage policies, we violate the same principle as when we practise discriminatory hiring policies. When we gear our welfare institutions to serve predominantly the middle class we repudiate human dignity as much as when we restrict our welfare programs according to race. When we approve, in our educational schema, the moral status of wealth, we display the same contempt for the creatures of God as we do when we approve the teaching of theories of racial inferiority. What is more important, we must keep clearly in mind that love of neighbor—love especially of the poor—is neither an intellectual position nor an elevating sentiment. It is an action. Here Martin Buber's insight is compelling, and I quote:

> The Bible knows that it is impossible to command the love of man. I am incapable of feeling love toward every man, although God Himself command me. The Bible does not directly enjoin the love of man, but by using the dative puts it rather in the form of an *act* of love (*The Writings of Martin Buber*. Ed. Will Herberg. p. 103).

Love of the poor, then, rests on Buber's dative. It is an act. The Sacred Books abound with concrete injunctions to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, do kindness to the stranger, comfort the brethren. Why? God answers: "What if he cries for redress, and I, the ever merciful, listen to him?" (Exod. 22:25). "Remember what God you worship." (Lev. 19: 9-10). Love of the poor is an act; it is enjoined because we are all of God, and God is the God of all.

If, then, love of the poor is the open manifestation of man's dignity in God, and, if love of the poor is, in the first instance, an act of the dative, it necessarily implies involvement. And essential element of love, of charity, of almsgiving, of the giving of comfort is an empathy that can come only from involvement and identification. God calls upon his people to love by recalling to their minds their own historical experience. "You were alien once, in the Land of Egypt" (Lev. 19:34). "Do not forget that thou wast once a slave in Egypt" (Deut. 24:19). These injunctions are directed as much at the Christian as at the Hebrew community.

Love of the poor, as a matter of fact, is related to human dignity only insofar as it involves empathy. Then, says Leo XIII in his encyclical on Christian democracy, *Graves de Communi:* "It neither connotes pride in the giver nor inflicts shame on the one who receives. The disposition to ask assistance from others with confidence, and to grant it with kindness, is part of our very nature."

The spirit of empathy and understanding, the reverence for human dignity, which is an essential part of love for the poor—of charity—is a value in itself. It is one of the prime sources of human enrichment and a marvelous example of the way in which Divine Providence draws good out of evil. For the spirit of empathy implied in a true love of the poor, as Pope Pius XI points out in a memorable passage of the encyclical, *Quadragesimo* Anno, goes far beyond the simple alleviation of physical want:

> But even though a state of things be pictured in which every man receives at last all that is his due, a wide field will nevertheless remain open for charity. For justice alone, even though most faith-

> fully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. Yet this union, binding men together, is the main principle of stability in all institutions, no matter how perfect they may seem, which aim at establishing social peace and promoting mutual aid.

Thus it is necessary not only to reshape our attitudes toward the notion of poverty, but to regear our involvement with the poor. We have had sufficient conservation about the dignity of man. What is required of us, as religious institutions, is to become involved with the man whose dignity we preach.

When we examine ourselves as administrators, employers and educators, we need to ask ourselves whether our institutions have abandoned the poor, both formally and symbolically. Do we seek energetically to find the poor? To serve them? To become one with them? Or are we, as institutions, becoming as middle-class as the majority of our people?

Moreover, our institutions must be concerned not only with the people they formally serve, but with the neighborhoods in which they are located. For a church, a synagogue, a school, or a hospital is not merely an institution. It is a religious institution. It is a symbol—an image, if you will—of religion and of God. The religious institution, which remains aloof from its neighborhood and whose administrators do not involve themselves with the aspirations, causes, and organizations of the neighborhood, are by virtue of their symbolic role denying God in that neighborhood. This is as true of an orphanage, for instance, which does not normally serve the immediate neighborhood, as it is true of a settlement house.

Finally, we need to beware of the trap of putting religion in the role of a tool toward better race relations. As religious men, we reject racial intolerance not primarily because we are useful in removing it, but because it is a denial of the God of Israel. It is the people of God who alone bear the responsibility for racial intolerance. This is an awesome responsibility. Neither the Jew nor the Christian can escape it. He can only fulfill it, or fail at it; and failing at it, he bears false witness not only to his neighbor, but to God.

OPEN DOORS, CLOSED DOORS AND VATICAN II

EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX, O.P.

It is a general conviction that, in the first session of Vatican II, the "open door" group at the Council triumphed. The reason, I think, is not that this group stands for "progress" at the moment, but rather that they have brought to the fore some aspects of truth which had apparently remained unnoticed by the so-called "closed door" group. Even on a secular level, what gives a proposition dynamism and vitality at any given moment is always the kernel of truth it contains.

So we must not forget that the kernel of truth defended by the conservative group also contains a dynamic power whose magnetism may well operate in the second session of the Council. The danger here is that the narrow or one-sided positions of the "closed door" group might force themselves upon many Council Fathers along with their kernel of

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truth, precisely because this truth is expressed in a ready-made, essentialist thought-form. Therefore, I think that the "open door" group should give more thought to its own position in order to forestall this possibility in the second session. The other side should also reconsider its position.

There were unmistakable misunderstandings during the Council debates, both in and out of St. Peter's —especially in connection with the terms "ecumenical" and "pastoral." As we define the term, "ecumenical" describes an attitude which, through faith, is sensitive to the visible unity of all men who acknowledge Christ as Lord, a unity not only of love and hope, but also of belief; even, in a broader sense, the unity of all men who recognize the value of religious worship in the life of mankind.

CATHOLIC ECUMENISM

The ecumenical attitude of Catholics, however, acquires a special stamp because of their belief in the one universal Church. "Ecumenical" is thus an attitude of Catholics who would like to let the totality of their faith develop to its full advantage. This view introduces a distinction between the uncontaminated essence of the Church as Christ established it under the apostolic episcopate with its pontifical head and its empirical manifestations throughout history, where various forms of one-sidedness have found external expression. As a result, certain Catholic values have fallen into the background of religious belief and practices. But it is precisely these obscured or neglected truths and values which non-Catholic churches, and even certain non-Christian religions, often practice more vitally and with greater authenticity than does the average Catholic. Therefore Catholic ecumenism is heading in the right direction when it emphasizes these truths and values.

DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING

The "Roman theology" seems to have understood the word "ecumenical" in an entirely different way. This was expressed in a very striking manner by a bishop at the Council who spoke out saying: "Where will all this end, if we must suppress one Catholic principle to avoid offending the schismatic Orientals, and de-emphasize another Catholic principle to avoid offending the Anglicans, and finally keep mysteriously silent about other Catholic truths so the Reformed churches won't pull against us?" This exclamation speaks volumes. "Roman theology" apparently understands "ecumenism" in the sense of "irenicism": the suppression or at least the de-emphasis of Catholic principles which would turn away Orientals, Anglicans and the Reformed churches from Catholicism.

It is unfortunate that certain Council Fathers of the "open door" have encouraged this Roman conception. However much we should emphasize whatever unites us in the one God, we must not obscure real differences out of a false irenicism that only throws sand in the eyes of other Christians. I mean the real difference between the Catholic *faith* and non-Catholic Christian *faith*, not between non-Catholic Christian faith and a particular Catholic *theology*. For a theology can stress what faith itself does not. In this way, differences can arise between Catholic theology and other confessions when

both sides are really talking about the same principle of *faith*.

One can detect a similar misunderstanding in the use of the term "pastoral." John XXIII's emphasis on the pastoral character of this Council is well-known. This concerns a re-evaluation of old truths which need to be expressed in a way that gives them new appeal to present-day mankind. But misunderstanding is possible here, too, and, in fact, the Council debates afforded examples. Some seem to think that the insistence on pastoral orientation in the Council meant a purely pragmatic, care-of-souls approach that is not too concerned with truth itself or that is at least less concerned about the formulation of truth. Of course, the first pastoral duty is to present the truth. But the question here is how one conceives of truth: abstractly or existentially, that is, founded in actuality.

THE NAKED TRUTH

To give a truth a new expression suited to one's own time does not mean that we first strip it of all its human representations and associations, in order to see it sharply and squarely, and then give it a "new look" by putting it into modish clothes. The *expression* of a truth is in itself an insight into the truth. There is never a moment, not even a fraction of a second, in which we can contemplate the "naked" truth. A new expression of a truth is not something accidental; it involves the insight itself which we have into the truth.

Unquestionably the "Roman theology" (with all the nuances and qualifications that term requires) gives the impression that a scholastic formulation of truth is the only way of speaking which preserves its truth. All other expressions are considered "pastoral," which to partisans of the "Roman theology" means containing a lesser degree of the truth. "Pastoral theology" thereby becomes identified with "watered-down theology." But the very expression of the truth should reveal its pastoral character; the "pastoral" aspect cannot be just a pious corollary or devout appendage to an essentialistic, abstract truth, which is nonpastoral in itself. A council is obviously pastoral by its very nature, for the presentation of the truths of salvation is an intrinsically pastoral activity.

NO ETERNAL MODEL

When absolute truth is emphasized in contrast to changing times, there frequently arises a misunderstanding or at least an unspoken assumption that a particular moment or phase in history can be torn loose from its context and set up as a supratemporal, supralocal model for the Church for all time to come. If this is true at all, I think it could only apply to the primitive apostolic church with its still normative scriptural documents. To set up a certain moment in church history, even a high point such as scholasticism, as a norm for every further insight into truth, is in fact a form of relativism, under the guise of "maintaining absolute truth." This is so because a relatively successful theological synthesis (such relativity is intrinsic in any human system of thought) would thereby declare any new synthesis inadmissible.

The fact that what is modern today becomes outdated tomorrow im-

plies only that the expression of truth is a never-completed task; it must always be attempted anew. But it can never imply that a particular historical expression should be upheld as a supratemporal statement which alone is suitable for the formulation of the pure content of faith. To do so is to strike at the heart of truth while we think we are saving it from the vicissitudes of human history. Therein lies, as I see it, the painful mistake of people who think (rightly) that the Church should speak "in her own tongue," but then identify this tongue with one particular phase of the language of revelation.

In this connection, there is the question of language in the proper sense of the word, and hence of terminology. Latin is often called the Church's own language. There are many reasons historically why this is true, and we should not underestimate the benefits which have come from this fact. Moreover, I willingly admit that the use of Latin was a blessing at the Council because it could be understood by all without the inevitable distortions of translation.

Nevertheless, some people see advantages in Latin not because it is a concrete universal language but simply because it is a "dead language" which can no longer develop spontaneously. This attitude implies that "unchangeable truth" must be a "dead something" which can easily be classified in dead formulas. Moreover, we can observe here again a remnant of an essentialist concept of truth—just as much an error as the relativism of some modern tendencies. In our human thinking, we must always distinguish between the "truth in itself" and "truth as recognized and believed by men," so that the absolute value of our knowledge is guaranteed by the inner tendency of our own never-exhaustive vision of reality, which supplies the continuity between our still incomplete insights into truth. These ever-changing aspects throw light upon reality, or truth, and thus insure an ever-clearer perspective upon the truth. Therefore, "progressiveness" is a condition if truth is to be allowed the free scope due to it.

TRUTH ALIVE

A new point of view, a new sensitivity to the times, even though it may often include some falsehood, nevertheless throws a new light upon the truth. It permits a new insight which formerly was not seen, at least not explicitly. A "dead language" which does not grow along with the new attitudes of the times is, by that very fact, powerless to integrate the new aspects of the truth except in a very artificial, and thus unreal and sometimes dangerous way. For these reasons it can work hand in hand with conservatism—not that it shelters falsehood, but rather it so encloses the kernel of truth in formulas that any further growth in insight is looked upon as an accidental, extrinsic addition. The result is that eventually, by this sealing-off, the kernel of truth which was formerly discovered, and still remains true, is now placed *in a false light.* Often in the Council debates I have observed how the "progressives," who, others thought, were attacking the kernel of truth itself, were only fighting against this sealing-off. And so there was a holy indignation on both sides. For me, this was the best, though painful, evidence of how the

onesidedness of pure conceptualism (which goes hand in hand with essentialism) makes difficult any fruitful dialogue at the Council between the "open" and "closed" groups and elicits suspicious insinuations—as though the "open door" were not as concerned about the truth.

CONSTELLATONS OF TRUTHS

Does a statement still appear true today when presented to us once more in precisely the same outlined and sealed-off form as before? I believe that herein lies a persistent misunderstanding. What earlier councils (for example, Trent and Vatican I) have defined as dogmatic, rightly *remains* (now and a hundred years from now) a norm for Catholic faith. But a complementary truth, one for example passed over in silence or not stressed by Trent, because of reaction or simply because it did not happen to be at issue then, could well point to a more important and religiously valuable aspect of truth than the issue which Trent defined. Moreover, it could be that the Tridentine aspect possesses its uniquely Catholic significance only within the totality of this complementary truth of faith. Is it then concretely "true" merely to repeat the Tridentine aspect, affirming it anew, while we pass over the complementary truth once more? A conscious placement of a portion of truth outside of its totality always threatens to become a "heresy"—Greek *hairesis,* a part cut off from the whole. A truth can thus actually be put in false light. To prevent this was often the real intention of the so-called "open door."

THE BASIC CONFLICT

John XXIII, with his priestly feeling for the care of souls and his historical attitude, was especially sensitive to these complementary aspects of a particular truth. Therefore, he ordered this Council not to repeat what had already been defined. Truth as a human property is never supra-temporal or supra-local, apart from time or place. The denial of this fact (that is, making one interpretation of truth absolute) betrays its fatal operation in what we have called "essentialist thinking." I maintain that herein lies the basic conflict that broke out in the first phase of this Council. The misunderstandings about the ecumenical and pastoral emphasis of the Council are only the results of it.

If people will keep these things in mind, then the second phase of the Council will not be characterized by a schema *"de fide* pure *custodienda"* (because obviously, all of us presuppose the fundamental principle of keeping the faith pure, though not all stress it). Rather let it be distinguished by a schema faithful to the truth: *"de fide* vitaliter *custodienda"*: How can we in this present age keep the true faith alive and vital?



WORLD REACTION TO *PACEM IN TERRIS*

DONALD R. CAMPION, S.J.

To understand or interpret Pope John's encyclical on peace and world order, it is essential to have at the outset some awareness of its meaning as a sociological and historical phenomenon. This is so for at least two reasons. Without some understanding of the document's impact on world opinion, one could easily underestimate or miss entirely the existential significance of many individual passages or of the ensemble of teaching in it. Similarly, it seems to me, one would never comprehend the mind and intention of the encyclical's author—a matter of basic interest to anyone seeking to analyze, interpret or evaluate it.

An address given during the Conference on Peace and World Order sponsored by the Chicago World Peace Center, held at St. Xavier College, Ill., June 14, 1963.

Of course, much of the sociological or historical impact of *Pacem in Terris* remains to be registered. What is already clear, however, is that the encyclical drew an unprecedented reception from the moment of its issuing—one might say, even prior to its appearance. This fact alone merits examination.

There were, to begin with, what might be called the expected or traditional reactions. Catholics in general could be counted on to show respect, deference and even general enthusiasm for what had been announced would be a major papal statement. By tradition or etiquette, one could also look for formal expressions of appreciation from public figures in the so-called Catholic lands.

In addition, given the current wave of ecumenical interest and activity, it came as no surprise to learn that leaders of other Christian churches quickly spoke out in praise of Pope John's initiative. Spokesmen for other religious communities also joined in voicing support for the encyclical's broad principles of world peace, brotherhood, tolerance and moral responsibility.

In light of the impact previously generated by the warm, outgoing personality of Pope John, one was prepared for general expressions of admiration, from many sides, for his energy, optimism and fatherly concern for mankind. Nevertheless, the reception accorded *Pacem in Terris* has transcended the expected response. Let me enumerate a few examples of what I have in mind:

1. *Among world political figures:* Here in the United States, we saw the unprecedented release of a statement of approval of *Pacem in Terris* by a spokesman for the State Department. This was followed by President Kennedy's own expression of appreciation and support for the encyclical and for the Pope's leadership. (I would also note, in passing, the striking parallel between many passages in the President's address of June 10, 1963 at the American University in Washington, D.C., and corresponding passages in the encyclical where the Pope spoke of human rights and responsibilities, of the need for disarmament and an end to nuclear arms testing, of the possibility of evolution in Communist men and nations, etc. Even more interesting than the question of whether these were conscious echoes in the President's text is the question of whether it would have been politically possible for Mr. Kennedy to have taken so "open" an approach to relations with the Communist world if the Pope had not made such statements somewhat respectable, if not more acceptable, in certain quarters.)

One should also note the perceptive comments made by the UN Secretary General, U Thant, in his formal tribute to the encyclical and to its author. Elsewhere on the world political scene, it is a matter of record that the document received careful attention from such leaders as Nehru, de Gaulle, Adenauer and others.

2. *In the Communist world*: The encyclical received a remarkable amount of publicity in the Soviet press as well as in papers and periodicals in most other Communist nations, with the notable exception of China and Albania. Chairman Khrushchev himself gave lengthy

praise to specific statements in the encyclical during the course of an interview with an Italian journalist; references to the encyclical were also made by Communist party leaders in practically all the Western nations. There appeared an unparalleled series of stories and comments in our own Communist paper *The Worker*. Indeed, the encyclical prompted overtures to Catholic groups by Gus Hall and others.

3. *In some Catholic circles*: Reaction ranged from indifference, to incomprehension, to veiled hostility, to open criticism, or to what one review described as a "crisis of confidence." Writing after the Pope's death, Barbara Ward Jackson pretty well summed up what I have in mind:

> There is no denying that the Pope's approach roused profound misgivings in some Catholic ecclesiastical and political circles. Conservative Italians accused him of making communism respectable and thereby adding a million votes to the Communists in Italy's recent general elections. Right-wing Germans stonily attacked him for "selling out" German interest to the Poles and the Russians. A few American leaders clearly preferred the old black-white simplicities of the cold war. . . . It seems highly probable, therefore, that there will be a counterattack in favor of more cautious policies.

4. *In general:* Whatever their personal judgments on its contents, commentators and analysts almost universally agreed that the encyclical represented a major accomplishment of an extraordinary pontificate; many took the view, too, that history might prove it to be a landmark in both ecclesiastical and world history.

I make this over-lengthy introduction because I very much believe it would be idle to discuss the encyclical as if it were simply another doctrinal or pastoral pronouncement of the Pope. My point is that in a few months it has already *made* history, and there are serious-minded people who hold that we have just begun to see its history-making potential. Allowing for the exaggerations produced by popular reaction to the "image" of Pope John, exaggerations inevitably heightened by the tragic events which so swiftly followed on publication of the encyclical, it still seems necessary to take all this into consideration when one begins to ask: What is the meaning, the secret, the significance of *Pacem in Terris?*

In what follows, I have made an effort primarily to take note of what I considered to be significant comments made thus far on the encyclical. My survey covers a fairly large portion of the American religious and general press, together with a certain number of foreign newspapers and journals. In the interest of saving time and sparing my hearers, I shall not attempt to footnote each remark I have borrowed from others. It is only fair to note, moreover, that my own comments and views are often woven into those cited from them. My purpose in all has been, hopefully, to stimulate reflection and discussion, rather than to attempt to propose a complete analysis or interpretation of the document as a whole.

It should not be necessary to underscore the fact that the encyclical is not a political tract, or even an essay in political science or philoso-

phy. Unfortunately, many commentators fail to grasp that point, hence their effort to read into, or out of, *Pacem in Terris* all sorts of immediate political implications. Thus, some have seen in it a break with the United States, a repudiation of NATO, a turning toward the Communist empire, a wooing of the newly emerging nations of Africa and Asia and of the neutralist world in general. One need only glance at the Pope's approving description of contemporary developments in the constitutional law of nations, however, to see that the Western democracies have not been completely disowned. Perhaps what has confused such short-sighted commentators is their failure to see the true scope of the document. Limiting discussion for the moment to this very point of the encyclical's meaning in terms of the Cold War and related world conditions, I think that the *Manchester Guardian* came far closer to the truth when it remarked that *Pacem in Terris*

> is one of the most satisfactory attempts which has yet been made to work out the ground rules of ideological coexistence between East and West, in a form which might, in the distant future, be acceptable to both sides.

Any attempt to read the encyclical as a formula for instant peace, instant disarmament, instant world order (or instant human redemption, for that matter) is doomed to failure.

To dwell on this point a moment longer, I call attention to the utterly sound sociological sense of paragraphs 161-162 of *Pacem in Terris* in which the Pope insists on the need for patience in undertaking the task of adapting or restructuring human institutions. This same sense of the laws of social process and this repect for the dynamics of history characterized the encyclical's great predecessor, *Mater et Magistra.* These qualities naturally escape the understanding of those Catholics whose preference is for essential concepts and formulations completely divorced from time and space or the wear-and-tear of experience as we know it in the human condition. They likewise set off the Pope's thought and approach from the doctrinaire utopians.

Mention of the Pope's thought brings to mind the question of his style. It is a commonplace among commentators that the style in this instance is very much the man. The encyclical breathes serenity. With perhaps the single exception of a brief passage in which the Pope lets his heart speak out on the horror of war, the tone throughout is calm, matter of fact and direct. Students of papal documents will note that, even more than in the case of *Mater et Magistra,* the language is clear and contemporary. Gone, too, are the rhetorical patches which, we are told, one bishop, at the first session of the Second Vatican Council, deplored as signs of "triumphalism" in ecclesiastical style. The Pope does insist on the Church's authority as teacher, but he commends this authority to his hearers, not by claiming that the past is without its dark spots, but by demonstrating concretely to mankind his sense of responsibility as Pontifex Maximus in the ancient sense of being the guardian of human freedom and defender of the natural law against profane invaders.

A further point concerns the encyclical's combination of the new and the old. Anyone familiar with the body of Pope Pius XII's writings and addresses cannot miss the extent to which Pope John's pronouncements on war, disarmament, world authority and other specific themes derive from, or agree with, the teaching of his predecessor. The same must be said with respect to some of the broader themes or concepts of the encyclical. Certainly the opening sections will never seem completely novel to anyone who is familiar with Pope Leo XIII's four encyclicals on human liberty, especially his *Libertas Praestantissimum*, and his letters to the French hierarchy on democratic institutions and the French republic. Yet it should be admitted that in many instances Pope John has added to or significantly modified the teachings of earlier Popes. Call it merely an explicitation of previous teaching or what you will, his statements on relations between Church and State, on the relation between the society and the state, his remarks on equality and freedom as ideals, his accent on the distinction between error and the person in error represent contributions that must be recognized as bearing his own hallmark.

What explains the new elements in Pope John's pronouncements? Here it is difficult to distinguish between what may have been at least partly derived from earlier papal teaching and that which is the essence of its personal or original touch. Perhaps the only possible answer is to sketch the constellation of qualities that add up to what may be called the "new look" introduced by John XXIII. I have already mentioned his sociological awareness. This means, for one thing, a sensitivity to the fact that contemporary society is characteristically and consciously pluralist and historical. Hence, he sees the task to be one of exerting force from within the dialectic, rather than endeavoring to formulate and impose ideal juridical structures.

Certainly, too, an important quality of his thought is its refusal to accept defeatism, despair or any variety of calamitous historical determinism as the only prospect for man, created in the image of the God who is supremely the Lord of history.

For the Catholic, this document must sound a strong missionary note. The summons to infiltrate every major social institution and there to act as the leaven of salvation is perfectly clear. The Pope himself writes in a way that admirably reflects the great missionary principle of adaptation. For too long, the voice of the Church has been absent from many areas and has not been heard by many peoples. For his own part, he has here splendidly exemplified that principle of *aggiornamento* which he had managed to "sell" to most of the Church as a main guideline in the Second Vatican Council. This means not only facing up to new problems but also presenting perennial truths in a way calculated to win an audience anywhere today.

I incline also to the view that no one can adequately understand the meaning and thrust of *Pacem in Terris* unless they have some familiarity with other of the author's consistent attitudes. In his opening address to the Catholic bishops of

the world at the start of the Second Vatican Council, for instance, he spoke bluntly of his unhappiness in the presence of "prophets of gloom." Lest this be taken, however, as a sign that we are therefore dealing with the sentimentalism of a soft-hearted but wooly-minded old man, one should note also the logical coherence of this encyclical and the clear-sighted realism with which it speaks of such human shortcomings as egoism, group and national pride, the tendency to "lord it" over others, and the other evidences that this is a far from perfect world. This realism takes in both good and bad, however, as the quietly optimistic summaries attached to the first four major divisions of the encyclical amply testify.

More and more, as I note reactions to the encyclical, both viewed as a whole, and more particularly those parts having most to do with the present divided state of the world, I incline to think that fundamental orientation of the document flows from a profound insight which the Pope shares with some other Christian thinkers of our day. It is an insight which takes in more than the present scene and past realities. The temptation at this point is to give this insight a label that would serve to identify it with a visionary like Teilhard de Chardin. This does not seem to me to be allowable, since I think it would mislead both friends and foes of Teilhard at this stage of the discussion. Raising the question may, however, serve to indicate why I cannot be too concerned by the negative reactions of those who feel that the Pope somehow had missed the tragic dimensions of human history in our age. My own impression is that he fully comprehended current human tragedy, but that he also saw the whole human drama in far vaster terms than those known to the self-styled, "realistic" observers of our day.

Whatever the merits that so many saw in the encyclical, one could anticipate hearing voices of dissent raised against it. With considerable insight, a group of French experts, gathered for a discussion of the new papal letter shortly after its publication, pointed to the major sources from which criticism of the Pope and of his teaching would come. Briefly, they identified the following five groups.

1. Some fundamentalist or strongly conservative Protestant groups would be likely to reject the encyclical's optimism about man's capacity to order human society in any truly moral sense. (This prediction was quickly verified in the United States when the pronouncedly conservative Protestant journal *Christianity Today* set forth its respectful but highly critical editorial judgment on *Pacem in Terris*, a judgment which found the encyclical wanting on precisely this score of un-Christian optimism.)

2. Protestant intellectuals of another school, together with many secular scholars, would balk at the Pope's insistent stress on natural law as a point of departure in the ordering of human society or for the identification and defense of human rights. (This was precisely the note struck by two such distinguished Protestant scholars as Dean John C. Bennett and Reinhold Niebuhr in their comments on the encyclical for *Christianity and Crisis*.)

3. Certain nationalist groups in various countries could be expected to object to the papal support for a true world community and a corresponding world authority having some measure of standing over the nation-states.

4. Some of the more rigidly doctrinaire Marxist circles expressed objection.

5. Some other elements, largely of the political right, and largely Catholic, also voiced criticism. (A few of these voices had early been raised against the encyclical on the basis of advance rumors concerning its contents; others had been conducting a campaign of complaint against Vatican policies toward the Communist nations for some time, e.g., in the pages of *Il Borghese* of Milan or of our own *National Review.*)

With respect to those who chose to dissent from the encyclical, I believe it important to note certain distinctions among them.

1. There are those who have registered disappointment over specific items or aspects in the document, e.g., the Pope's "failure" to spell out a judgment on nuclear arms and atomic war in terms of the traditional "just war" theory. A Canon Drinkwater in England, to be sure, could conclude that the Pope's words on the subject "can only mean that atomic warfare is not morally lawful." Yet, Dr. Howard Schomer, head of a Protestant theological seminary in Chicago, writing in the *Christian Century,* could remark that "on no topic is . . . updating more clearly required than on the ancient theological doctrine of the 'just war' and the resultant practice of the Church toward conscientious objectors."

Personally, I incline to the view of some European Catholics, including the French Jesuit author on international relations, Fr. Robert Bosc. These see the Pope passing over in silence the theoretical distinction between a just and an unjust war. They go on to ask whether this is not simply because he recognizes that wars between nations have today become sociologically inadmissible (as had proved true centuries ago in the instance of wars between feudal lords), and that, thus, the issue of moral justification is no longer a real one. This is not to say that the conceptual framework of the "just war" theory should be junked entirely. Its application may well prove necessary and fruitful in the larger task of rendering judgment on the exercise of power, in the sense of physical force, by an international authority.

2. Of a different nature are some more general complaints. These, as I noted above, have been directed in some instances to concrete actions of the Vatican in regard to the Kremlin and other Communist powers. The critics I refer to here would arrive at different prudential judgments on some of these policies, and on some of the orientations suggested by *Pacem in Terris.* Thus, Max Ascoli, for example, writing in the *Reporter,* would observe that the Pope "has taken a gigantic risk for his Church—and not only for his Church."

Here also, one should perhaps include Robert Strauz-Hupé, who commented in the pages of the Washington *Post* that, if the encyclical's remark about the possibility of a

"drawing nearer together" with opposing ideological groups means that "the Church must come to terms, as it has done in Poland, with a tryannical regime, then this advice can pass for a practical, although perhaps unheroic, formula for survival." I judge from his remark that Prof. Strauz-Hupé would reject this.

3. Yet another type of objection along general lines came from critics represented in this country by some writers in the *National Review*. Frank S. Meyer would seem to suggest that Pope John stands guilty of "a supine refusal to carry out our moral responsibility to separate, as best we can in this world, right from wrong and to challenge the onrushing evil." And, in a passage which leaves one wondering how carefully the same writer read the encyclical, he queries: "Why, with all the references to the encyclicals of his recent predecessors, is there none to *Divini Redemptoris* of Pius XI?" (For the record, one can find the encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* cited explicitly in footnotes 39, 46 and 47 of *Pacem in Terris*.)

Even more blunt is James Burnham, writing in the same publication, who answers his own question: "Why is the Vatican putting forward a policy of peaceful coexistence?" He sees two possible explanations: 1) The Vatican may actually be deceived about the nature of the Communist enterprise and may actually believe that a *modus vivendi* can be reached with them; 2) the Vatican may have cynically concluded that the West is finished and that the Church must prepare itself for coming to terms with the new Caesar.

4. Possibly the most intriguing of Communist reservations concerning Pope John's encyclical appeared in the guise of an editor's note added to an abridged version of the encyclical when it was published in the Moscow weekly *Za Rubezhom*: "The Editorial Board considers it necessary to emphasize that many statements of the encyclical are derived from the principles of the Catholic creed, which is incompatible with the solely scientific Marxist *Weltanschauung*." One is tempted to find in this cautionary note some evidence that the editors in question foresaw the possibility described by Fr. John F. Cronin when he observed that "the Church must reject communism as a system. But individual Communist leaders can change, as reason and common sense force them to a more correct view of human nature and society. The Pope is seeking, gently, gradually and prudently, to encourage such change."

5. There remains, finally, that group referred to in an irreverent manner by the British *New Statesman* when it remarked that "like Khrushchev, Pope John has his hands full in keeping his 'Chinese' in order." The reference, of course, is to the "ultras" among Catholics in many countries. I shall content myself with noting here that their approach to a document such as *Pacem in Terris* is often as ingenious as it is misguided. Perhaps, we will see someday an attempt to "demythologize" this encyclical through a process comparable to that employed by a Catholic priest writing about Pope John's *Mater et Magistra* in the June issue of an American clerical journal, the *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*. His basic approach was to convey the impression that a sensible, original doc-

ument had been drafted by the Pope's "officially designated authors," but that this text somehow became corrupted in "a sort of shadowland" prior to actual publication. (This priest critic generously allows that the Pope is to be judged more the victim that the culprit when one assesses the blame for aberrations in the encyclical — aberrations here meaning, of course, the sections the critic doesn't like.) This interesting example of experimentation with the methodology of *Formgeschichte* criticism is, of course, another proof of the essential radicalism of some conservative mentalities.

Despite the occasional sour notes of criticism, a survey of world comment on the last encyclical of Pope John reveals remarkable agreement among men of the most varied ideological and religious backgrounds in allowing that the encyclical "spoke for man." Walter Lippmann, for instance, found that "in it Western man has finally found a long-sought definition of the meaning and purpose of a free society." A French commentator, Bernard Gardey, writing in *Signes du Temps,* saw *Pacem in Terris* as a "monument of human experience." George Shuster, in *Ave Maria,* summarized other elements of its appeal when he hailed it as "remarkably subtle, comprehensive, worldly wise and outspoken," while yet being blessed with a "refreshing lack of recipes for dealing with specific problems." And Barbara Ward concluded, in the pages of the London *Observer,* that Pope John in the encyclical and in his own life "contrived with the utmost simplicity to speak to the human condition, to give mankind a glimpse, however fleeting, of how this world might look if it were under the governance of love."

MINDS AT WORK



INVOLVEMENT ■ What will today's students do about the social ills of the world they live in when their turn comes to tackle those problems?

Will the Catholics among them translate the Church's social doctrine into social reality?

Will they learn the craft of leadership? Apply principle and statesmanship to the conduct of labor-union affairs? Manifest justice in their stance as managers or employers?

Will they leaven their neighborhoods with the gospel, show an example of concern for neighbors in need, be witnesses to Christ

for some who may read no other gospel than that which is written in their Catholic neighbor's life?

It would be depressing to suppose that young men and women today are not eager to wrestle with the social problems of the world. It would be dismaying to learn that even now they may be avoiding opportunities to cultivate attitudes and to initiate action.

Students in other countries often are at the very center of political controversy, and in our own country there seems to be a trend toward increased interest in politics among students. But what is the direction of their interest? Are they concerned only when government action might put the touch on their own pocketbook or their potential bankroll? Do they have a nihilistic stand on taxes? Do they swallow the epithets of latter-day America Firsters to whom less fortunate nations are "rat holes"?

It would be unfair to suppose that today's students hold themselves aloof from the social question. But it is perfectly fair to wonder whether their intentions are realistic and worthwhile, when it is obvious that the parents of many of the present student generation have done little to promote the general welfare of their neighborhoods or the larger community.

Putting bumper stickers on the family car to advertise a progressive or nonprogressive candidate for office is one kind of political activity, and it is tempting to enjoy the stares and glares that greet the advertisements. But is this to be the limit of the citizen's political activity? What about our immigration laws? This past summer when President Kennedy proposed again that they be overhauled and brought into closer conformity with our tradition of justice and fair play, was there a warm response from students? From Catholic students? (Or from their parents, for that matter?) How many know anything about the built-in bias of our national-origins scheme for limiting immigration from southern Europe? How many know that extremely few Oriental people can come to this country under our present laws?

How many care?

And this comes close to the heart of the matter. Can I love God whom I do not see when I do not love my neighbors whom I do see?

—JAMES M. SHEA *in* TODAY, *December, 1963.*

FULL CITIZENSHIP ■ *A man cannot be accepted into only a part of our civil structures, either city, state or nation. He must be fully a citizen or we make a mockery of what we like to call civilized life. To be civil the common signs of community friendship must stretch to the borders of the civic unity in which we live. Anything less, no matter how it is excused, is merely tribalism, and a barbarous abuse of hard-won civilization as well as of men.*

—*The* REIGN OF THE SACRED HEART, *October 1963*



MRS. JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY ■ Crises are like flashes of lightning which illumine the depths and foundations of the human spirit amid the dark storms of life.

During the recent tragic events, we have been profoundly inspired by the power of the Christian faith to cope with the evils and sorrows of this world as that power has been manifested in the life of Mrs. John Fitzgerald Kennedy.

Her dignity and poise under the most shattering circumstances were a demonstration of the grace that enables the Christian not merely to endure but to transform tragic sorrow into triumphant courage.

Her loving concern for her children and her efforts to enable them to share the Christian understanding of the nature of human life, the fact of death and the reality of the life to come were an example to every parent.

Her sensitive response to the feelings of others was demonstrated in countless thoughtful acts during the rush of events. She remembered the needs of her household, of her guests from abroad and of the people as a whole. In meeting these needs, she avoided the excesses of sentimentality, political and national aggrandizement.

In a day when, by the grace of God, the various households of faith are being drawn closer together, we have seen clearly in the demeanor of Mrs. Kennedy the majesty and the solace of a Christian commitment. We give thanks to God for this witness before the nation and the world.

—*A resolution presented to the General Assembly of the* NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, *December 17, 1963.*



SALVATION AND WORK ■ No matter what kind of work we do, all of us suffer in varying degrees from a failure to associate our work with our salvation. Weekdays of work separate themselves from Sundays. The Sunday sermon does not seem to pertain to the daily struggle to earn a living. This applies to both employers and employees, and for the same reason. We have been too long taught that a man's salvation depends exclusively on God and himself. The third party, "the neighbor," doesn't enter into the equation. This is the *individualistic* approach to religion which nearly contradicts the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ. Pope John XXIII wrote along these lines in *Mater et Magistra:*

> We should not foolishly dream up an artificial opposition—when none really exists—between one's own spiritual perfection and one's active contact with the everyday world, as if a man could not perfect himself as a Christian except by putting aside all temporal activity, or as if, whenever he engages in such activity, a man is inevitably led to compromise his personal dignity as a human being and as a believer.
>
> Far from this being so, it is perfectly in keeping with the plan of Divine Providence that a man should develop and perfect himself through his daily work.

Pope John speaks about a man's developing and perfecting himself through his daily work. This is certainly a real problem for a worker who all day long performs a particular operation which is not meaningful in itself. He has no sense of accomplishment. He may also find himself working for a very large corporation where there is no personal relationship with the employers. He derives no satisfaction from a personal commendation for a task well done. Under these impersonal conditions, it's very difficult to see any connection between saving your soul and your work.

The answer lies in the love of Christ, in a personal devotion to Christ, which directs the sense of justice a man possesses. On various occasions, such as a strike, most men will be inspired by the demands of justice and will make sacrifices in pursuit of it.

The problem lies in seeking justice day in and day out in unspectacular ways. Success here springs from a genuine love of Christ. His love for Christ will inspire a worker to do an honest day's work, no matter how boring. He translates his love for Christ in terms of his "neighbor," his fellow workers, his employer. He sees Christ in them, no matter how difficult this may be, and seeks to aid them in every possible way. His sense of social justice, sparked by love, enables him to see his task as contributing to the success of the entire enterprise and to the welfare of all who depend upon its success.

The ideal Christian worker does his job as a member of the Mystical Body of Christ. He realizes that he works in union with Christ, his Redeemer, and that he shares in the redemption of all men through Christ. This gives nobility to his work and contributes to his personal sanctification.

We are such a long way from this ideal. This approach seems so pious and impractical. It isn't. But it's no easy task to convince both employers and workers that this approach is real and practical, that it produces happiness, that it pays dividends.

—REV. DANIEL E. JOHNSON *in the* CALDRON, *October 15, 1963.*

JOBS *and the* NEGRO: *Some Statistics*

LOUIS F. BUCKLEY

■ A recent national study made by *Newsweek* magazine indicates that whites and Negroes agree on a number of matters: Negroes are discriminated against; Negro jobs are not equal to those of whites; job integration is acceptable now; Negro jobs will be better five years from now. There is serious disagreement, however, concerning the pace at which the Negro is making progress in the United States. Three-fourths of American whites believe Negroes are moving too fast, while only three per cent of Negroes believe this to be the case. For my part, it is difficult to understand how it is possible to move "too fast" in achieving justice and equality of opportunity.

Contrary to popular impression, the Negro's economic position relative to that of the white man, has actually deteriorated over the last ten years. The Negro has steadily and consistently fallen behind in terms of employment. Year by year, since 1947, the nonwhite unemployment rate has fluctuated at a level well above the white rate, but the gap between the rates has been least when there are employment opportunities for everyone—e.g., during the post-war boom. In 1947, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 64 per cent higher than the white rate; in 1952, it was 92 per cent higher; in 1962, it was 124 per cent higher and it remains so today. Since 1955, the jobless rate of nonwhite teenagers has increased faster than for white youngsters, moving up to about 60 per cent among nonwhites, compared

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An address during a panel discussion sponsored by the **Social Action Department, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Brooklyn,** December 10, 1963. Mr. Buckley is New York regional administrator, Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor.

to a 30 per cent rise for white youth. The percentage of nonwhites in the total unemployment ranks has increased from 19.8 per cent from October, 1962 to 22 per cent in October, 1963.

Nonwhite workers not only have higher unemployment rates, they spend a considerably longer time looking for work between jobs. Although they constitute only 11 per cent of the work force, 26 per cent of those unemployed for 15 weeks or more in 1962 were nonwhites, compared to 20 per cent in 1954. Similarly, the percentage of nonwhites unemployed for 27 weeks or more increased from 24 per cent in 1954 to over 28 per cent in 1962. Since 1957, nonwhites have consistently had a higher proportion of their total unemployment concentrated in the group out of work 15 weeks or more.

Nonwhite workers are also increasingly bearing the brunt of involuntary part-time work. The proportion of employed nonwhites working part time in nonfarm industries for economic reasons is 10 per cent—more than triple the three per cent rate for whites. Significantly, this rate has been moving up for nonwhites for the past 6 years, but has remained virtually unchanged for whites.

■ Negroes made great advances during World War II and during the boom years that followed because the serious shortage of labor enabled them to enter many jobs which had been closed to them before, especially semiskilled work in factories. With the slowdown of the economy after the Korean War, however, nonwhite family income has shown little change since 1952-53. The ratio of nonwhite to white average family income in 1962 was 53 per cent. It has fluctuated from around 56 per cent in 1952-53 to a low of 51 per cent in 1958.

The number of Negro families in the lower income brackets declined at a slower rate than did the number of white families between 1955 and 1962. The proportion of white families with money income under $3,000 dropped by 34 per cent compared to a 22 per cent decline among Negro families. In 1955, 25.7 per cent of the white families and 57.3 per cent of the Negro families had incomes of under $3,000, while in 1962, 17 per cent of the white families and 44.5 per cent of the Negro families were in this income group.

■ There have, to be sure, been some gains—inadequate though they are—in the proportion of nonwhite workers in the higher skilled and better paying white-collar occupations. The number of nonwhites in white-collar jobs has risen by 50 per cent since 1955, two and one half times the increase for whites. Nonwhite workers have been entering some of the professional, technical and clerical fields faster than they have taken up other white-collar occupations. The largest relative gains posted by nonwhites between 1955-62 were in professional services (such as hospital, medical and other health services, welfare and religious institutions) and business and repair services. Nonwhites also recorded relatively sharp gains in the growing field of educational services—a 60 per cent rise compared to the 50 per cent rise among whites. Government policies that assure nondiscriminatory employment practices may account for the continued gains registered by nonwhites in public

administration since the mid-1950's —up 40 per cent compared to an 18 per cent rise among whites. The percentage of nonwhite workers who are employed as craftsmen and foremen increased, while that of white workers decreased between 1955 and 1962.

This kind of progress is important. It confirms the fact that there are no elements in this situation which cannot be overcome. Moreover, it points up the truth that this cruel disparity is of our own making and that it is ours to overcome.

■ Despite this limited progress in the transfer among nonwhites to white-collar and skilled occupations, it must be recognized that in 1962 only 17 per cent of all employed nonwhites were in white-collar occupations, compared to 47 per cent of white workers. White workers in this group outnumbered nonwhites 28 to 1, in marked contrast to their comparative representation in the civilian labor force (10 white for each nonwhite worker). Unless there is a substantial acceleration of the trends noted, the percentage of nonwhite workers in white-collar employment will be substantially below that of white workers for many years to come. The rate of increase in nonwhite employment in the white-collar occupations must be accelerated, as these are the occupations which will show the greatest rate of growth in the future.

In many respects, the future is even bleaker for the nonwhite worker, because the gap between the occupational distribution of nonwhite workers and the nature of the demand for workers in the labor market is constantly widening. Forty-three per cent of nonwhite, compared to 25 per cent of white workers are in semi-skilled or unskilled occupations. These jobs tend to be concentrated in goods-producing and related industries that are quite sensitive to the business cycle. Moreover, the demand for this type of labor has diminished steadily during the postwar period as a result of automation and other technological developments. On the other hand, less than ten per cent of nonwhite workers, compared to over 30 per cent of white workers, are employed in professional, technical, managerial and sales occupations, where the demand for workers is expanding.

■ I am particularly concerned over the problem of white and nonwhite young people who seek to enter the labor market before they are qualified for the expanding professional, technical and skilled occupations. The post-war baby crop is now hitting the labor force. A total of 3.8 million people are reaching the age of 16 this year, as compared with 2.8 million last year, an increase of 35 per cent in one year. This is the age when the largest percentage of young people leave school without completing their high school education. The marked increase in the rate of unemployment of teen-age young people in the past several months is indicative of what we can expect for some time unless there is a much greater increase of job opportunities for which they are qualified. This growing competition for a limited number of jobs for which young people qualify may lead to antagonism between the races and provide a receptive group to whom extremists may appeal. We should remember that jobless, disappointed

youths quickly grasped at the solutions offered by Hitler.

■ It is essential that we face up to the hard, brutal economic facts we have been discussing. They emphasize that a large segment of the American Negro population continues to lag seriously behind other Americans according to almost every norm used to determine economic well-being. In certain categories, the gap between the white and the Negro is widening rather than closing. The time has come when we must realize that the exploding impatience and the disciplined protest of the Negro are reaching the breaking point. Unemployment is an important cause of the Negro revolt, especially in the North. The protest against "discrimination" is in many places a protest against the fact that Negroes are bearing relatively more and more of the brunt of unemployment and low income. As someone has put it, Negroes should be allowed at least to gain equality in unemployment and poverty. But for most people, unemployment is something happening to someone else, some place else. Not seen at first hand, there is no real sense of imminent danger.

President Johnson has stated with simple eloquence that we have talked long enough in this country about equal rights. We have talked for a hundred years or more. The Negro today asks justice. We do not answer him, the President has reminded us, when we reply to the Negro by asking for his "patience." It is time each of us, as workers, employers and members of religious and other groups took action now to eliminate the human misery and the economic waste which result from racial prejudice. If we can accomplish this—and accomplish it we must—the chances for expansion of freedom and democracy throughout the world will be infinitely enhanced.

NEGRO CRIME ■ *Awareness of crime among Negroes should develop in us fear, not of those trapped in the ghetto, but fear of the ghetto system. This demands* desegregation, *not—as the racists would have it—continued segregation.*

—MIKE REAL *in* COMMUNITY, *May 1963.*

DOCUMENTATION

CHRISTMAS MESSAGE

Pope Paul VI

Beloved Brethren and Children:

■ We extend to all of you best wishes for a blessed Christmas. We wish this blessing to enter into the heart of each one of you and to implant there that sense of happiness, of peace, of serenity and of trust that is born, in such a special manner, of this holy feast and that forms one of the most consoling experiences of life.

May each one of you who receives Our affectionate greeting experience internally the sweetness, the comfort and the happiness that We wish you. Today, people who possess so many objects of so-called exterior happiness often stand in need of interior happiness, the only kind that is genuine, personal, profound and sincere. And it is this kind of happiness that We desire each of you to enjoy.

The address of His Holiness broadcast in Italian from Vatican City on December 23, 1963. This is the English translation supplied by the Vatican Press Office.

■ We send our blessing above all to you who are suffering, because you stand in greater need of it, to you who are sick, to you who are aged, to you who are sad, to you who are weeping, to you who hunger and thirst for justice. We would like to stand beside each one of you to bring you the sweet, sincere, consoling words of Christ.

Next, We send our blessing to our dear little children. You see in Christmas your special feast, the feast of new life, the feast of wholesome affections, the feast of the joy of living.

In the years that lie ahead for you, may the Lord preserve and increase your happiness and teach you the secret of that happiness, which is contained in your innocence. We extend Our greetings to your families who are reunited around your table, around your gifts, around your crib filled with homespun and life-giving beauty.

We extend our best wishes to you, the members of social groups, who on this annual occasion balance the accounts of your capabilities and your needs, in order that your sense of justice may be accompanied by that of orderliness and of love.

We send our blessings to those of you who are exiles and fugitives, whose anxieties and sufferings are well known to Us, to those of you who, faithful children, are deprived of the freedom that is due to you, to those of you who are suffering for Christ and for His church and who today, more than ever, are close to Our heart.

We send Our greetings to all the peoples and nations on this earth, to which the message of peace descends today from heaven and fills the world with trust and good will.

■ A blessed Christmas to all. We communicate Our best wishes because Christmas is a religious and Christian feast, and We know very well the honored place it holds amid the varying conditions of human life.

But then another consideration comes to mind. In Our desire to extend to all Our brotherly and fatherly best wishes, Our eyes try to perceive the view of the whole world as seen from what We might call the watchtower over the world, from that lofty position where Our responsibility has placed Us.

And then we are reminded that Our good wishes ought to be related, not only to the humble longings that are so common on a happy popular feast, as Christmas ordinarily is, but particularly, too, to the real and pressing needs of people.

Our affection cannot ignore the great sufferings, the deep longings, the painful necessities that concern great segments of society and even entire peoples.

To observe realistically the human scene, Our mood must change from joyous to pensive because We are pointedly asked this question: What are the great needs of the world today to which our desires must be related, if they are to be helpful and wise?

The needs of the world. The very question makes one dizzy because these needs are so vast, so manifold, so inmmeasurable. But some of them are so evident and impelling that all of us understand them, at least to some degree.

■ The first problem confronting the world is that of hunger. We know that it has long existed, but today it has been, at last, recognized. It has now been scientifically proved to us that more than half the human race has not enough food. Entire generations of children even today are dying or suffering because of indescribable poverty.

Hunger produces sickness and wretchedness. These, in turn, increase hunger. It is not prosperity that is wanting to vast numbers of people. It is mere sufficiency.

And unless this heart-rending situation is relieved, foreseeably, it will grow worse.

The demographic increase of starvation areas has not yet been balanced by the economic increase of the means of sustenance, despite the spread of information and methods of economic development. Rather, these have imparted an uneasy and rebellious consciousness of suffering. Hunger can become a subversive force with incalculable results.

One who studies this unforgettable and threatening problem is sometimes tempted to have recourse to remedies that must be regarded as worse than the problem itself. For they consist in attacking the very fecundity of human life by means that human and Christian ethics must condemn as illicit.

Instead of increasing the supply of bread on the dining tables of this hunger-ridden world, as modern techniques of production can do today, some are thinking in terms of diminishing, by illicit means, the number of those who eat with them. This is unworthy of civilization.

We know that the problem of demographic growth, when unaccompanied by sufficient means of sustenance, is very grave and complex. But it cannot be admitted that the solution to this problem consists in the use of methods contrary to the divine law and to the sacred respect that is due both to marriage and to new born life.

This gives us added motivation to look with profound sympathy at the multitudes of men who suffer hunger, and to observe with anxious attention the manner in which men study and handle the enormous problems connected with this tragic situation.

Even though we are not given Christ's miraculous power of materially multiplying bread for the world's hunger, still we can take to heart the plea that rises from the masses, still oppressed and languishing with misery, and to feel it vibrate in us with the very pity which was felt by the heart of Christ, which is both divine and completely human: *"Misereor super turbam"* . . . "I have compassion on the multitude. . . . They have nothing to eat" (Mark 8:2).

■ We make our own the sufferings of the poor, and We hope that this Our sympathy may itself become capable of enkindling that new love, which by means of a specially planned economy will multiply the bread needed to feed the world.

We are therefore openly in favor of everything that is being done today to help those who are devoid of the goods required for the elementary needs of life.

We see with admiration that, in the years following the destruction of war, great projects of international aid have been launched to give witness to a fresh flowering of human nobility, and to offer generously to entire masses of unknown peoples the spontaneous and well-organized gift of indispensable food.

We should like to encourage and bless this magnificent endeavor, at once manifold and providential. We are happy to note that Christian principles give rise to, pervade and promote these praiseworthy and beneficial undertakings.

It is also gratifying to observe that some of these initiatives come from Catholics owing to the merits of persons endowed with Christian genius, of worthy pastors who sustain these noble undertakings, and of so many of the laity who give heart and money to the cause.

Praise must also be given to the able directors who organize these works and to the courageous executives, who render admirable service. We pay a special tribute to these valiant men.

This then is Our first Christmas wish: that charity may reign in the world; that the love brought by Christ, born as a child in this world, and kindled by Him among men may blaze forth ever more widely until it can wipe away from our civilization the dishonor of the misery that weighs upon men like ourselves and our brothers in Christ.

This greeting reminds Us of another problem, not unlike the problem of individual hunger in its humanitarian scope, but different in the methods by which a solution is to be realized. We, therefore, greet those nations on their way to development.

Our universal mission as shepherd of the world makes us look with great sympathy and with loving interest on those new nations that are now reaching that sense of identity, that dignity, that ability to function, peculiar to free states.

■ We look especially to those nations of Africa and Asia. It pleases us, on this birthday of Christ, to salute their own birthday to independence and to the harmony of international life.

We wish to recall with them the high origin of their vocation to liberty and to human receptivity to the Christian message. We pray that they may always know where to discover the sources of true humanism and where to find that reserve of moral energy with which a people acquires the exact

concept of human life and finds the wisdom and the strength to express in its laws and in its customs both the great principles of civilization and the peculiar forms of their native genius.

We know that these new nations are justly proud of their sovereign liberty and that they can no longer admit the domination of another state over them. But we know also that these nations have not yet reached that degree of self-sufficiency that is required to enjoy all the cultural and economic benefits of a fully modern state.

It is clear that our charity this Christmas, in its search to discover the great needs of the world, must recognize the necessity of helping these emerging nations, not with humiliating and self-seeking beneficence, but with scientific and technical assistance and friendly solidarity of the international world. We mean brotherhood rather than paternalism.

■ This is what We desire for these new nations—that they may enter as brothers into the family of nations, bringing with them their own original civilization as well as their recent cultural and social progess, in the spirit of solidarity, harmony and peace. May they find in the same family of nations the respect due to them and the help of which they are still in need.

We cannot pass over the fact that the Catholic Church herself, by means of the missions among these peoples, has always striven, without thought of temporal gain, to develop them to their utmost capacity, always holding in honor all their human and upright qualities, while proclaiming to them their vocation to the true and supreme destiny of redeemed man, and offering them, at great sacrifice and out of pure love, the benefits of education, of health services and of social formation.

In all of these activities the aim is not to establish a relationship between superior and inferior or between strangers, but to educate men to attain Christian brotherhood and civil autonomy.

We therefore wish that Catholic missions may always find a friendly welcome among the new nations, and may always know how to render devoted and loyal service to promote the spiritual, moral and material development of these nations.

■ While We view the entire panorama of nations, We can not but mention again another pressing need of mankind—peace.

This is suggested by Christmas itself since, as we all know, this feast is presented to us as a message of peace bestowed from Heaven upon all men of goodwill.

This is treated in the greatest encyclical of Our venerated predecessor, John XXIII, who addressed himself to the fundamental question of peace in our modern world. The developments and controversies of our time force us continually to consider the nature of peace, its forms and weaknesses, its needs and progress.

This encyclical (*Pacem in Terris*) has shown us, if We may so put it, the new problems of peace and the dynamism of the elements from which peace must result.

St. Augustine's classic definition of peace as the "tranquility of order" seems to be applicable today, in the sense that the tranquility and security of peace are the product of the well-ordered movement of component parts, rather than being something static and fixed. Peace lies in well-balanced motion.

■ There are other reasons for mentioning peace in Our Christmas message. First, it is necessary to heed the yearning of the new generation. Youth desires peace. Secondly, we see that peace is still weak, fragile, threatened, and that in not a few, fortunately limited, regions of the earth, peace is violated.

We observe with some apprehension other obvious facts. Peace in the present time is based more on fear than on friendship. It is maintained more by terror of deadly weapons than by mutual harmony and faith among peoples. And if tomorrow peace were to be broken—which God forbid—all humanity could be destroyed.

How can we celebrate Christmas with serenity when such a threat hangs over the world? Therefore, We urgently beseech all men of good will, yes, all men who hold responsible positions in the field of culture and politics, to consider as fundamental the problem of peace.

True peace is not that hypocritical propaganda aimed at lulling the adversary to sleep and concealing one's own preparation for war. Peace does not consist in pacifist rhetoric that refuses the indispensable, patient and tiresome negotiations which are the only efficacious means of achieving peace.

Peace is not based merely on the precarious balance of opposing economic interests, nor on the dream of proud supremacy. But true peace is based on the abolition, or at least on the mitigation, of the causes that endanger its security, as nationalistic or ideological pride, the arms race, lack of confidence in the methods or in the organizations that have been constituted to render the relations among nations orderly and friendly.

Peace in truth, in justice, in freedom, in love—this is the peace we pray for.

At this point, Our Christmas wishes touch upon another need related to that of peace. And it is the answer to this elementary question: Why are men not at peace with each other? Because their minds are not united.

Union of minds is the great need of contemporary man. Culture, which awakens and, in great part, fills this want, in the end, does not fully satisfy it. On the contrary, culture exacerbates the minds of men by putting into circulation an indiscriminate pluralism of ideas.

Men lack unity in their principles, in their ideas and in their view of life

and of the world. As long as they are divided they will continue to be ignorant of one another, to hate and to fight against one another.

From this, it is easy to see the importance of the doctrinal element in the fate of humanity. We clearly see how blessed we are by the coming of Jesus Christ into the world. He came to forge a unique link between all mankind and God, the Heavenly Father.

This religious link, respecting and ennobling each man's person as it does, is the most solid and hopeful basis for unity between men. The true sociology of human peace takes its rise from Christian religious unity. It is this unity, introduced by Christ into human thought and history, that we earnestly desire for the peace, concord, mutual understanding and happiness of all men of good will.

■ This is the greeting We send out with the pealing of the Christmas bells. We direct it especially to those whom We believe to be most ready to receive it: to Christians still separated from us and to Catholics happily united. *Ut omnes unum sint:* that all may be united. That was Christ's sublime and final prayer before His passion. We make it Our own on this day which commemorates His coming.

Sons and brothers and all men of good will, these are the desires with which Christmas fills Our heart. They have been so profound and so insistent during these first days of Our pontificate, and during the Second Vatican Council that we have decided, as you know, to go very soon to Palestine, the land in which Christ, the Son of God, came down from Heaven, lived, taught, suffered, died, rose from the dead and from which He ascended again into Heaven.

We have been moved to do this because We wish to express anew our faith and love for Him and also because We feel that, by uniting ourselves with Him in the Gospel setting, We shall be able to carry out with greater perfection and success the mission entrusted to Us for the word's salvation.

Once again we declare clearly that the nature and purpose of our pilgrimage are solely religious.

Our journey will be that of Peter's witness. We wish to include in Our own faith that of the whole Church, and with Peter at Caesarea Philippi, say to Jesus: "Yes, Lord, You are the Christ, the Son of the living God."

It will be a journey of offering. As the Magi from the East, the symbols and precursors of all peoples of the earth, so We from the West wish to bring to Jesus the offering of His Church and to acknowledge in Him the Founder and its Master, its Lord and its Saviour.

■ It will also be a journey of search and of hope: search for all those who are for Us sons and brothers in Christ in the atmosphere of the Gospels, evoked by this land of benediction. How can We not ask Ourselves: Where is the full flock of Christ? Where are the lambs and the sheep of His fold?

Are they all here? Which ones are missing? And so we cannot but implore Jesus the Good Shepherd, using His own words: May there be "one fold and one shepherd."

And Our heart will reach out also to those outside the fold of Christ, and Our good intentions will embrace all the peoples of the earth, those far and near, with sentiments of respect and of love, wishing them happiness and peace.

We shall greet respectfully and cordially all, whatever be their origin, whom We shall meet on our way, especially those in authority, the people, the pilgrims and the tourists, but without stopping in Our hurried pilgrim's journey, and without allowing Ourselves to be distracted from the solely religious purpose of our trip.

It will thus be a journey of prayer, made with humility and with love. In Our heart will be present the whole world. No one will be forgotten.

In asking pardon from our Lord, the merciful One, for all Our faults, for all Our weakness, We will not hesitate to beg for all men mercy and peace and salvation.

And the wishes which on this holy Christmas Day We have expressed in behalf of the Church and of all men of goodwill, in the Holy Land will be more intensive and more efficacious.

But even now we look to their realization, as we invoke the intercession of the Blessed Virgin and of the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, and as We impart to you Our Apostolic Benediction.

DOCUMENTATION

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Most Rev. Emile De Smedt

■ Very many conciliar Fathers have insistently demanded that this sacred synod clearly explain and proclaim the right of man to religious liberty. Among the reasons given, four principal ones should be listed:

1. *Truth:* The Church must teach and defend the right to religious liberty because there is question of the truth, the care of which was committed to her by Christ;
2. *Defense:* The Church cannot remain silent today when almost half of mankind is deprived of religious liberty by atheistic materialism of various kinds;
3. *Peaceful Social Life:* Today in all nations of the world, men, who adhere to different religions or who lack all religious belief, must live together in one and the same human society; in the light of truth, the Church should point the way toward living together peacefully;
4. *Ecumenism:* Many non-Catholics harbor an aversion against the Church or at least suspect her of a kind of Machiavellism because we seem to them to demand the free exercise of religion when Catholics are in a minority in any nation and, at the same time, refuse and deny the same religious liberty when Catholics are in the majority.

The address of Bishop De Smedt of Bruges, Belgium, as he introduced the draft on religious liberty to Vatican Council II, November 19, 1963.

■ Religious liberty is such a grave problem in modern society that it cannot be omitted in a pastoral decree on ecumenism. Therefore, we submit to your deliberations this fifth chapter of our schema on ecumenism. The Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, to the best of its ability, has carefully watched over the preparation of this material.

Since we are treating of a most difficult question and, at the same time, one of great importance in modern life, the authors of the schema cherish the hope that your attention and pastoral consideration will emend what needs emendment and perfect what is still imperfect in the schema now offered to you.

The term "religious liberty" has a definite meaning in our text. In the forthcoming discussion, great confusion might arise if any of the Fathers give to the expression a meaning that differs from the one intended by the text.

When religious liberty is defended, it is not asserted that it is proper for man to consider the religious problem according to his own whim without any moral obligation and decide for himself according to his own will whether or not to embrace religion (religious indifferentism).

Nor is it affirmed that the human conscience is free in the sense that it is, as it were outside the law, absolved from any obligation toward God (laicism).

Nor is it said that falsehood is to be considered on an equal footing with truth, as though there were no objective norm of truth (doctrinal relativism).

Nor is it admitted that man in any way has a quasi-right to maintain a peaceful complacency in the midst of uncertainty (dilettantistic pessimism).

If anyone were to insist upon giving any of the aforesaid meanings to "religious liberty," he would attribute to our text a meaning which neither the words nor our intention possess.

What therefore is meant in the text by "religious liberty"? *Positively, religious liberty is the right of the human person to the free exercise of religion according to the dictates of his conscience.* Negatively, it is immunity from all external force in his personal relations with God, which the conscience of man vindicates to itself.

Religious liberty implies human autonomy, not from within, certainly, but from without. From within, man is not freed of the obligations toward the religious problem. From without, his liberty is offended when obedience to the dictates of his conscience in religious matters is impeded.

■ At this point, two questions must be asked: 1) Can each man claim for himself religious liberty as a sacred right given to him by God? 2) Is there, and to what extent is there, a duty on the part of others to recognize the aforesaid religious liberty?

Our decree, since it is pastoral, tries to treat the present matter es-

pecially from the practical point of view and, after the manner of John XXIII, will carefully strive to remove the whole question from that world of abstractions which was so dear to the 19th century. The question is put, therefore, regarding real man in his real dealings with other men in contemporary human and civil societies.

I

■ The first pastoral problem which must be examined now by this sacred synod is this: How must Catholics, because of their Faith, conduct themselves toward men who do not belong to the Catholic Faith? We propose the following answer for your deliberations:

1. All Catholics are invited by Christ to strive by prayer, penance, witness and evangelizing in the Holy Spirit to bring our non-Catholic brothers to the blessing of the evangelical light and of the life of the Church. The sacred, absolute rights of God, as well as the evangelical and natural truths, must always and everywhere be honored and observed by them.

2. They must abstain from all direct and indirect coercion. Although God wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth, the disciples of Christ may not infringe upon the religious liberty of the individual person. On the contrary, they must respect and esteem the right and duty of non-Catholics to follow the dictates of their own conscience even when, after sincere and sufficient study, it errs in good faith.

What is the reason of faith why non-Catholics can be forced by no one to admit the Catholic doctrine against their conscience? This reason is found in the very nature of the act of faith. For this act, on God's part, is a supernatural gift which the Holy Spirit most freely gives to whom and when He wills; and, on man's part, it is and must be an assent which man freely gives to God.

3. All Catholics are bound, by the command of the Lord, to love and to help their non-Catholic brothers with a sincere and active charity.

II

■ At this point, the schema takes a step forward and asserts that each and every man who follows his conscience in religious matters, has *a natural right* to true and authentic religious liberty. In this second part, it is proposed that the sacred synod solemnly demand religious liberty for the whole human family, for all religious groups, for each human person whether his conscience be sincere (*rectam*) and true, or sincere and false, concerning faith, provided only that he sincerely follow the dictates of conscience. Therefore, a general principle is laid down: No human person can be the object of coercion or intolerance.

What is the reason why observance of religious liberty is demanded of all? The human person, endowed with conscience and free activity, *since he can fulfill the will of God only as the divine law is perceived through the dictate of conscience, can obtain his ultimate end only by prudently forming the judgment of conscience and by faithfully carrying out its dictates.*

From the nature of things, in forming this judgment, whereby man tries freely to conform to the absolute demands of God's rights, neither any other man nor any human institution can take the place of the free judgment of man's conscience. Therefore, the man who sincerely obeys his own conscience intends to obey God himself, although at times confusedly and unknowingly, and is to be considered worthy of esteem.

When religious liberty is violated, then the very freedom of the human person is violated in its principal matter, in a fundamental demand, in man's ordination to the supreme and ultimate end. The greatest injury is to prevent a man from worshiping God and from obeying God according to the dictate of his own conscience.

III

■ The schema takes still another step forward and enters upon a most difficult question. Religious liberty would be fruitless and empty if men were not able to carry out the dictates of their conscience in external acts whether in private life, in social life or in public life, or if human persons were prevented from forming religious groups whose members could worship the Supreme Deity by common and social acts and lead a religious life.

Here, however, there arises a most difficult problem. For, if a human person carries out the dictates of his conscience by external acts, there is danger of violating the rights and duties of another or of others. Since man is a social being and since in the human family men are subject to error and to sin, the conflict of rights and the conflict of duties cannot always be avoided.

From this it is evident that the right and duty to manifest externally the dictate of conscience is not unlimited, but can be, and at times must be, tempered and regulated for the common good.

This ordering of the common good must be done juridically in human society and belongs to public authority (*potestati publicae*). "One of the fundamental duties of civil authorities, therefore," we read in the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (para 62), "is to co-ordinate social relations in such fashion that the exercise of one man's rights does not threaten others in the exercise of their own rights nor hinder them in the fulfillment of their duties. Finally, the rights of all should be effectively safeguarded, and, if they have been violated, completely restored."

How is public authority to carry out this duty? In establishing order for the common good, public authority can never act contrary to the order of

justice established by God. As St. Thomas says: "Human law is truly law to the extent that it is in accordance with right reason; and therefore it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. Insofar as it departs from reason, it is a so-called 'wicked law,' and therefore is not truly a law but a kind of violence" (i-ii, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2um).

Recent Roman pontiffs again and again have bewailed the fact that not a few governments have gone too far in this matter, ignoring and violating religious liberty. In our own day, there are some regions in which tolerance in religious matters has been so little observed that the Supreme Pontiff, Paul VI, in his allocution to the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council on Sept. 29, 1963, said, speaking of the violated right to religious liberty:

> Because of sufferings of this kind, with what sadness are We affected, and how deeply We are grieved, when We behold that in some territories religious liberty, together with the other principal rights of man, is suppressed by the principles and arts of those who do not tolerate opinions different from theirs on politics, on races of men, or on religion of any kind. We are sorrowed also by the many injuries which are done to those who would like to profess their religion honestly and freely.

IV

■ In order that we might clearly understand the doctrine of the Church on the extent and limits of the civil power's duty relating to religious liberty, we must, in a few words, develop the history of this doctrine. Bear with me, Venerable Fathers, if I seem to make more than just demands on your patience. But the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity is convinced that many difficulties and confusions can be avoided in the study of the schema if, before the discussion begins, I show very briefly what the supreme pontiffs, since the time of Pius IX, have taught concerning the duties of public authority in religious matters.

On the question of religious liberty, the principal document is the encyclical *Pacem in Terris,* in which Pope John XXIII especially developed these two points of doctrine: 1) By the law of nature, the human person has the right to the free exercise of religion in society according to the dictates of a sincere conscience (*conscientia recta*) whether the conscience be true (*conscientia vera*), or the captive either of error or of inadequate knowledge of truth and of sacred things; 2) to this right corresponds the duty incumbent upon other men and the public authority to recognize and respect that right in such a way that the human person in society be kept immune from all coercion of any kind. (cf. *Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 55, 1963, p. 299; p. 264 and pp. 273-274).

Moreover, this doctrine must be understood as the contemporary terminus

of a process of evolution both in the doctrine on the dignity of the human person and in the Church's pastoral solicitude for man's freedom. This doctrinal evolution took place according to a twofold law:

1. *Law of continuity:* The Church's doctrine and solicitude are always self-consistent, always remain the same. This perennial doctrine can be expressed in the words of Pope John: "The dignity of the human person demands this, that in his actions man should enjoy his own counsel and freedom" (ibid., p. 265). This doctrine has its deepest roots in the Sacred Scriptures which teach that man was made to the image of God. From this doctrine stems the continual pastoral solicitude of the Church for man's true freedom.

2. *Law of progress:* The ecclesiastical magisterium adapts, explains and defends genuine doctrine according to the demands of errors which are spread and according to the needs which arise from the development of man and of society. By this progress, the mind of the Church is led to search more deeply into doctrine and to understand it more clearly.

■ In this way, there has arisen in two areas a distinction which no one has explained more clearly than Pope John XXIII in his encyclical, *Pacem in Terris:*

1. A clearer distinction between false "philosophical teachings" and the "endeavors and institutions" which these ideologies give rise to or nourish. While on the one hand the ideologies are always to be condemned, on the other hand the economic, social and civil institutions which have arisen therefrom can contain something that is good and worthy of approval.

2. A clearer distinction between "errors" and the "person" who errs in good faith. While, on the one hand, errors must always be rejected, on the other hand, the man in error "does not cease to be endowed with human nature, nor does he ever lose his dignity as a person, due consideration of which must always be maintained" (ibid., pp. 299-300).

These two laws of continuity and progress must be kept before our eyes always when the documents of the Apostolic See are read and interpreted.

V

■ In this way the door is opened to a correct understanding of many pontifical documents which in the 19th century treated of religious liberty in such words that this liberty appeared as something that had to be condemned. The clearest example is found in the encyclical *Quanta Cura* of Pius IX, in which we read: "From this completely false concept of social rule (naturalism), they do not hesitate to foster that erroneous opinion which is

especially injurious to the Catholic Church and the salvation of souls, called by our predecessor Gregory XVI *'deliramentum,'* namely that the freedom of conscience and of cults is the proper right of each man, and this should be proclaimed and asserted in every rightly constituted society" (*A.A.S.* 3, 1867, p. 162).

As is evident, this freedom of conscience is condemned because of the ideology of the rationalists who founded their conclusions upon the principle that the individual conscience is under no law, and, therefore, is subject to no divinely given norms (cf. *Syllabus,* prop. 3, *A.A.S.* 3, p. 168). Freedom of worship is condemned also when it is based upon religious indifferentism (ibid., prop. 15, p. 170).

■ Finally, there is condemned that separation of the Church from the State which is based upon the rationalistic principle of the juridical omnicompetence of the State, according to which the Church is to be incorporated into the monistic organism of the State and is to be subjected to its supreme authority (ibid., prop. 39, p. 172).

To understand these condemnations correctly, we must see in them the constant doctrine and solicitude of the Church concerning the true dignity of the human person and his true liberty (law of continuity). For the ultimate basis of human dignity lies in the fact that man is a creature of God. He is not God himself, but an image of God.

From this absolute dependence of man upon God, there flows every right and duty of man to claim for himself and for others true religious liberty. For man is subjectively bound to worship God according to the sincere dictate of his own conscience (*juxta rectam suae conscientiae normam*) because objectively he is absolutely dependent upon God.

In order, therefore, that his absolute dependence upon God might not be infringed in any way, man must not be impeded in any way by others or even by public authority from freely practicing his religion. Therefore, in opposing the philosophical and political tenets of laicism, the Church was fighting for the dignity and true liberty of the human person. In accordance with the law of continuity, then, the Church, in spite of changing conditions, has remained consistent both in the past and in the present.

Leo XIII had already started this doctrinal development when he distinguished clearly between the Church, the People of God, and the civil society, a terrestrial and temporal people (cf. *Immortale Dei, A.A.S.* 18, 1885, pp. 166-167). By this means, he opened the way to a new affirmation of the due and lawful autonomy which belongs to the civil order and to its juridical dispositions. Because of this, it was possible to take a step forward (law of progress) toward a new judgment on "modern freedoms."

These freedoms can be tolerated (cf. ibid., p. 174; *Libertas Praestantissimum, A.A.S.* 20, 1887, pp. 609-610). And yet they were to be tolerated only. The reason was evident. For, at that time in Europe, the regimes

which proclaimed the modern freedoms, religious liberty among them, consciously drew their inspiration from the laicist ideology.

There was danger, therefore—and Leo XIII sensed this—that the civil and political institutions of this kind of republic, since they were of laicist orientation, would lead to such abuses that they would necessarily do violence to the dignity and true liberty of the human person. In accordance with the law of continuity, what was dear to Leo XIII is always dear to the Church—the safeguarding of the human person.

■ With the rise of state totalitarianism in its various forms, Pope Pius XI brought the pastoral and doctrinal development to a new height. There is no longer any danger, as there was in the 19th century, that the false concept of liberty might do violence to human dignity. There is a new danger, that every kind of human and civil liberty, and above all religious liberty, will be destroyed. For this reason, the Church is beginning in a new way to manifest her concern, which through the centuries has never wavered, for human liberty and dignity. With the increase of her pastoral concern, the Church's doctrine continues to develop.

Faithfully observing the law of continuity, Pius XI maintained the unstinting opposition of the Church to antireligious laicism: "Those things which Pius X condemned we also condemn; as often as there is in 'laicism' any meaning or purpose that is harmful or contrary to God or religion, we condemn laicism, and openly declare that it must be condemned, as alien to God and religion" (*Maximam Gravissimamque, A.A.S.* 16, 1924, p. 10).

But observing the rule of progress no less, Pius XI introduced a new distinction which was of great importance for a deeper understanding of Catholic doctrine. He made a distinction between the "freedom of consciences" and the "freedom of conscience." The latter he rejected as "equivocal," as often used by the laicist to signify "an absolute independence of conscience, which is an absurdity in man who was created and redeemed by God"; the former however, "freedom of consciences," he accepted, stating that he would joyfully fight the good fight for "freedom of consciences" (*Non Abbiamo Bisogno, A.A.S.* 23, 1931, pp. 301-302).

■ Moreover, Pius XI not only fought for the religious liberty of the faithful, but he was at the same time compelled to show the pastoral concern of the Church on a wider basis. For not only Christian, but human reality was at stake, if we can rightly distinguish between two things that are in reality one.

By way of new advances, Pius XI developed a truly liberal and Christian doctrine when he taught: "Man as a person possesses God-given rights which must remain immune from all denial, privation or interference on the part of society" (*Mit Brennender Sorge, A.A.S.* 29, 1937, p. 159). And he continues in no ambiguous words: "The believer possesses the inalien-

able right to profess his faith and to practice it in a proper way. Laws which interfere with or render difficult this profession and practice are in contradiction to the natural law" (ibid. p. 160). No one who understands the condition of the times and the purpose of this encyclical can fail to understand the universal intent of this statement.

Deeply sharing the pastoral solicitude of his predecessor, Pius XII developed further and expanded his doctrine (law of progress). One thing he kept before his mind: the human person, created by God, redeemed by Christ Jesus, yet placed in stringent circumstances and surrounded on all sides by dangers.

In this context of doctrine and pastoral solicitude (law of continuity) must we read the text which in this matter is supreme. Enumerating "the fundamental rights of the person," which must be recognized and respected in every well-ordered society, he repeats the doctrine of Pius XI and vests it with new authority, affirming "the right to the private and public worship of God, including religious *'actio caritativa'* " (Radio Address, Dec. 24, 1942, *A.A.S.* 35, 1943, p. 19).

The Roman Pontiff did not propose this doctrine as a tenuous opinion or as a theory belonging to the schools. On the contrary, he carries the doctrine to its juridical conclusions so that it becomes a principle according to which just limits are placed on public authority: "The chief duty of any public authority is to safeguard the inviolable rights that are proper to men and so to provide that each one might more easily fulfill his duties" (Radio Address, June 1, 1941, *A.A.S.* 33, 1941, p. 200).

■ Here we must recall especially the doctrine of Pius XII on the limitation of the state, because it deals with the suppression of errors within society: "Could it be that in certain circumstances He (God) would not give men any mandate, would not impose any duty and would not even communicate the right to impede or to repress what is erroneous and false? A look at things as they are gives an affirmative answer."

Then, having cited the example of divine Providence, he proceeds: "Hence the affirmation: religious and moral error must always be impeded, when it is possible, because toleration of them is in itself immoral, is not valid absolutely and unconditionally. Moreover, God has not given even to human authority such an absolute and universal command in matters of faith and morality. Such a command is unknown to the common convictions of mankind, to Christian conscience, to the sources of revelation, and to the practice of the Church" (*Ci Riesce, A.A.S.* 45, 1953, p. 798-799).

This declaration (law of progress) is of the greatest importance for our question, especially if we keep in mind what was in the past held concerning the role of the state.

■ At the end of this historical development comes the encyclical *Pacem in*

Terris. This document comes forth as the ripe fruit of a slow process of growth which has taken place within the Church, under the light of the Holy Spirit, throughout the whole of the last century.

Our schema had already been prepared and had been studied by the Central Commission and by the Commission for Co-ordination when Pope John, on April 11 of this year, published his last encyclical *Pacem in Terris*. We believe that our text is in complete conformity with his perlucid doctrine, which was received within the Church and outside of the Church with unprecedented praise.

■ We now submit this text for your consideration. In the historical conspectus of this doctrine, we have shown that, in the pontifical documents, along with continuity, we must look for a progressive spelling out of doctrine. It is evident that certain quotations from the Popes, because of a difference of words, can be put in opposition to our schema. But I beseech you, Venerable Fathers, not to force the text to speak outside of its historical and doctrinal context, not, in other words, to make the fish swim out of water.

Let our document be studied as it stands. It is not a dogmatic treatise, but a pastoral decree directed to men of our time. The whole world is waiting for this decree. The voice of the Church on religious liberty is being waited for in universities, in national and international organizations, in Christian and non-Christian communities, in the papers and in public opinion—and it is being waited for with urgent expectancy.

We hope that it will be possible to complete the discussion and the approbation of this very brief, but very important, decree before the end of this second session. How fruitful our work would appear to the world if the conciliar Fathers, with the voice of Peter's successor, could announce this liberating doctrine on religious liberty.

Venerable Fathers, we will add our labors to yours. Our secretariat will study your emendations most attentively and also with the utmost speed. We will work day and night. But our hope is in the Lord. May Jesus Christ assist all of us with His grace.

If at the end of this session He asks of us: "Young men, do you have any fish?" seeing the faith and good will of this council, He might say to their successors what once He said to the Apostles: "Cast the net to the right of the boat, and you will find" (Jn. 21:6).

IN THE MIND'S EYE



■ **LA VIE SPIRITUELLE** *(29, boulevard Latour-Maubourg, Paris 7), "Spiritual Lessons of the Council," by P.-Th. Camelot, O.P., December, 1963, pp. 718-735.*

As the second session of the Council opened, the bishops no longer "felt like novices," as Pope John had said of their feeling at the first session. But the great unknown quantity was the new Pope. It soon became apparent that he would, in Cardinal Suenens' words "give form and structure to the prophetic intuitions of his predecessor," and that he had the same Christian optimism and realism too.

A new stress appeared in the second session: emphasis on the Church as the People of God. Thus, the laity should see themselves as really God's People, called to holiness.

The Church is holy, even though made up of sinners. It is the People chosen by God, and chosen precisely to become holy: "Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect." The vocation to holiness is not for the privileged few. Even the evangelical counsels are for everyone, though they are to be carried out in different ways.

Granted that the Council is still feeling its way and seems to be moving too slowly. This is part of the human side of the Church, and should not shock us. Still, as rarely before, we can sense the very presence of the Holy Spirit, summoning us all to a sincere return to the spirit of the Gospel. This is what the Council is all about.

■ **THE FURROW** *(St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, Ireland), "The Layman in the Church," by Enda McDonagh, November, 1963, pp. 683-690.*

The layman in the Church seems like a new discovery, like the meson in physics, and almost as hard to define. Yet he is only apparently a new discovery—the result of an unbalanced development of the theology of the Church.

The Church must be understood in terms of Christ and His mission. Membership in the Church means membership in Christ. The clergy are not more completely members, but members with a different function. What is the layman's function?

The layman lives in the world and takes it seriously. He is aware of the goods of the world and can integrate them into his religious life. For, we must never tire of repeating, grace perfects, but does not destroy, nature.

The layman introduces the world into the Church. Among other things, he helps churchmen understand the true values of human science, art and technology.

But he also introduces the Church and its mission into the world. He does this directly by teaching, by Catholic action in the technical sense. But even more broadly, he reconciles the world with God through his life and work precisely as a layman: as a family man, a citizen, a scholar, a worker within the world. He works to sanctify the whole world by applying to it the saving effects of the redemption.

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

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